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TUE COUNTERPART OF FEDERAL LAW IN THE
LABOR EQUATION: INDIANA AS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF STATE LABOR LAW
I. FEDERAL AND STATE BACKGROUND
Is labor law exclusively federal in nature? Obviously it
is not. Yet, at initial encounter, many believe otherwise.
Nor does further investigation necessarily alter this im-
pression. Commensurate with increased exposure one
finds proportionate preoccupation with federalism. At that
juncture attention is drawn to the supremacy of federal
jurisdiction over that of the states. At least from a semantic
standpoint, however, understanding has progressed, for
"supremacy" necessarily connotes a relative concept which
differs substantially from the initial absolute reaction of
"exclusiveness." True, the major developments of the past
twenty-five years - the Wagner Act (1935) and Taft-
Hartley Act (1947), and the application of the doctrines
of free speech and preemption to labor law - have all been
on the federal level. However, relativity definitively con-
notes a comparison, and the counterpart of federal law
in the labor equation is state law. It is this area of labor
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law, both decisional and statutory, which has not only been
relegated to a minor role, but virtually forgotten and
often ignored.
Unquestionably, federal determinations and enactments
have materially affected labor-management relations and
will continue to do so. However, the initial benevolences
and abuses which Came to be known as "labor law" were
first fashioned by the state courts and legislatures. Federal
embellishment came much later and this new addition
neither lost sight of nor destroyed its origins.
At the outset, it is patent that a labor problem of intra-
state character must first find its solution in a state forum.
Nor does state influence in labor matters stop at state
boundaries. Historically, each federal extension of juris-
diction has created new problems and new areas for state
litigation. Illustrative are the federal doctrines of free
speech and preemption. Thus, when the Supreme Court of
the United States applied free speech to picketing and re-
lated activity,1 it was in one sense placing a loose limitation
1 The applicability of free speech to labor matters was first suggested in
1937 in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937), in
which Justice Brandeis, discussing the status of picketing under the four-
teenth amendment, observed that ".. . [Mlembers of a union might, with-
out special statutory authorization by a State, make known the facts of a
labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
-tion." Formal enunciation of the doctrine, however, awaited Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940),
where state and municipal enactments which prohibited all picketing were
held to violate the free speech guarantees of the Constitution. In AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), the free speech doctrine reached full maturity
when it was held that even stranger picketing, i.e., picketing by non-em-
ployees of the employer, was within the purview of this constitutional
guarantee and hence could not be enjoined by state courts. Milkwagon
Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), decided
the same day as Swing, and three cases decided shortly thereafter -
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Baker &
Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); and Carpenters and
Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1922) - treated certain excep-
tions and variations of the basic doctrine, but it remained essentially un-
changed until 1949. Then, in relatively short order the Supreme Court de-
cided four cases in which it tempered the free speech doctrine in cases
-where the picketing was violative of state law or policy: Building Service
Employees Intl Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); International Brother-
iood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior
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upon state courts, but to the extent that the vast majority
of free speech questions originate in state courts and few
ever reach the Supreme Court, the effect of the doctrine
was to provide state tribunals with another issue with
which to deal in the first instance. Similarly, shortly after
the Court had enunciated its Garner doctrine of federal
preemption, 2 thus contracting state influence, it found it
necessary to carve exceptions' to its contraction which had
Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). This new trend was reversed at least in part
by the federal preemption doctrine which was first enunciated in 1953 in
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See note 2 infra, for a dis-
cussion of federal preemption.
2 Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). While the
Garner case is regarded as having formally enunciated the doctrine of
federal preemption, rumblings of the doctrine were heard several years
earlier. In 1945, the Supreme Court in Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945),
struck down a Florida statute requiring union business agents to be licensed
subject to certain residency requirements and requiring unions to file ai-
nual reports relative to their activities. The basis of the decision was that
the Florida statute was "repugnant" to the National Labor Relations Act,
in that it would frustrate the collective bargaining process authorized by
the federal act. In 1947, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB had su-
preme and exclusive jurisdiction over the certification of a bargaining unit
of foremen engaged in interstate commerce and that action by the New
York Labor Relations Board relative to such employees was therefore in-
valid. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947).
These two decisions set the stage for the Garner case, which carried the
principle of preemption to picketing and related labor activity. Little was
added by such other pre-Garner decisions as LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. WERB,
336 U.S. 18 (1949) (Wisconsin board had no authority to certify bargaining
unit even though the NLRB had not acted); Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (states may enforce more restrictive union
security policies than those established by the Taft-Hartley Act, since
section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act permits the states to do so, 61 STAT.
451 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1952)); Plankington Packing Co. v. WERB,
338 U.S. 953 (1950) (Wisconsin Board has no jurisdiction over an un-
fair labor practice allegedly committed by interstate employer because
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national board); International Union,
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) (Michigan statute requiring strike
notices and a membership referendum invalid as repugnant to Taft-Hartley
Act and policies); Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach
Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) (attempt to impose compulsory
arbitration in public utilities labor disputes).3 See United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (state court retained traditional power to control
physical violence); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954) (state court had jurisdiction of common law damage action
even though conduct violated a federal act as well).
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the relative effect of expanding state jurisdiction. But
then - and quite currently - in Garmon v. San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council,4 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,5
and Fairlawn Meats, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
AFL,6 the Supreme Court ruled that the federal govern-
ment had preempted the labor field in interstate matters
even though a jurisdictional vacuum may be created by
reason of the refusal or failure of the NLRB to act.7 In-
stantaneously a partisan cry for congressional action arose
and a bill was introduced into the United States Senate
which would, in effect, cede jurisdiction to the states where
the NLRB had declined to assert jurisdiction.' Whether or
not this suggested bill has merit, one thing is certain: Con-
gress will feel constrained to agree or disagree with the
Supreme Court and eventually Congress will reduce its be-
lief to writing in the form of legislation.
At the outset of this writing, the view was expressed
that state law had been relegated to a minor role. Perhaps
at this point, this statement should be reiterated, but it
is becoming increasingly obvious that the role, although
perhaps small, is indeed focal. Yet with all of the develop-
ing clamor, very few of the noisemakers are cognizant,
except perhaps superficially, of the tools which the states
4 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P2d 1 (1955), rev'd, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
* 5 Utah 2d 68, 296 P.2d 733, rev'd, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
6 99 Ohio App. 517, 135 N.E.2d 689, appeal dismissed, 164 Ohio St. 285,
130 N.E.2d 237 (1955), rev'd, 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
7 In the main this failure or refusal to act is due to the Board's self
imposed limitations. In theory its jurisdiction is as broad as the commerce
power of the Constitution. The Board has declined, however, to accept all
cases affecting commerce. Prior to 1950 it exercised or refused to exercise
jurisdiction on a case to case basis. Then, in 1950, it established a "jurisdic-
tional yardstick," requiring the participants to prove a minimum annual
dollar volume of interstate commerce before their case would be heard.
These requirements were made more stringent in 1954. See Samoff, Handy
Guide to the July, 1954 NLRB Jurisdictional Standards, 7 LAE. L. J. 667
(1956); Symposium, NLRB Jurisdictional Standards and State Jurisdiction,
50 Nw. U. L. RPv. 190 (1955).
8 Senator Watkins of Utah introduced S. 1723. Similarly, an association
of state labor relations agencies was formed and held its first meeting at Madi-
son, Wisconsin, April 23-24,1957.
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have utilized, the various results which have been reach-
ed, and the articulation of the problems which have been
demonstrated on the state level. The issue is not the old
question of whether the states have reserved to themselves
all that has not been delegated to the federal government
or whether the federal government is completely supreme
in the field. Rather, the query revolves around what
procedures and substantive law can best bring about
equity, impartiality, and stability in labor relations. Thus,
in order to make an appropriate determination of whether
the states are to have more or less authority in the field of
labor relations, one must know what steps the states have
taken through legislation and judicial decisions to produce
equity, impartiality, and stability. Common beliefs re-
garding state law must be discarded and a long overdue
analysis undertaken.
Where does this investigation begin? While it would be
.desirable, space limitations do not permit a detailed an-
alysis of the decisional and statutory law of each state. On
the other hand, a general and superficial treatment would
be of little value. Unfortunately, a single common de-
nominator is absent, but for illustrative purposes a state
which has treated many of the aspects of labor relations
can be selected. This state should be neither a model of
enlightenment nor of confusion. If possible, this state
should not only illustrate legislative and common law
development but also should reflect something of a
composite reaction to federal growth as well as economic
and social motivations.
The choice of a state which meets these requirements
and hence could serve as an illustrative exercise requires
an initial inquiry into state law in general. Several cate-
gories are readily eliminated. At the outset, a few states
become atypical because the common law of the courts has
been superseded by legislation administered by state
1957)
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agencies.' Conversely, a limited number of jurisdictions
possess little substantive legislation and derive their
doctrines almost exclusively from the common law.'0
The remaining states fall into two basic categories: the
southern and some agricultural states have adopted "right
to work" legislation." "The development in most other state
states commenced with the common law and has undergone
a transition with the passage of anti-injunction legislation
similar or identical to the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 2
9 The following states and territories have enacted labor relations actr.
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, and
Wisconsin. They are all quite similar to the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
in the sense that they deal with certain unfair labor practices, and, in the
main, make provision for election of bargaining representatives under the
auspices of an administrative agency.
1o California (considerable body of isolated enactments), Delaware,
Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Vermont, and West Virginia.
11 Section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164 (b) (1952), enables a state to enact union security legislation which
is more restrictive than the Taft-Hartley union shop provisions. Section 14
(b) provides:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execu-
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Terri-
tory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law."
Accordingly, a number of states have enacted "right to work" laws which
prohibit union shop agreements. Such laws have been enacted in Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana (limited to
agricultural workers), Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
In two states there have been recent developments in this area. Thus, during
1956 the Louisiana right to work act was repealed (but repassed relative
to agricultural workers) while in Washington a proposed right to work law
was defeated by referendum by a 2 to 1 margin as recently as November,
1956. Also, in 1957, Indiana passed a right to work act and the Kansas
legislature called for a referendum.
.2 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). The following states and
territories have statutes prohibiting the granting of injunctions: Arizona,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Many of these statutes, like that of
Indiana, are patterned after, or copied from, the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Others, such as those of Illinois and Montana, are much less complete,
setting forth little more than a statement of policy.
[Vol. XXXir
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The state statutes of this latter category have acknowl-
edged the right of individuals to organize, bargain
collectively, and engage in activities directed toward fur-
thering their common aims. The acts thus have had the
effect of recognizing labor relations as part of our industrial
society and have attempted to equalize bargaining positions
of labor and management. To this extent, the test of imi-
partiality may well be satisfied by these latter states. At
least an effort to perform equity and attain stability in
labor relations is discernible in them.
Thus, the search has narrowed. Indiana is representative
of both these latter categories, and thus stands out as the
appropriate subject for examination. Its anti-injunction
statute is identical to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Some
decisions of the state are models of advanced articulation
while others are examples of kaleidoscopic confusion.
Obviously, both extremes are helpful for illustration and
analysis. Moreover, Indiana has the additional attribute
of being the only state of the last-mentioned group which
possesses an early common law history anticipating the
problems, rights, and duties inherent in contemporary
labor relations. Finally, and perhaps ironically, despite its
statutory and common law background, Indiana has passed
a right to work act.' In this respect it -occupies two ex-
tremes. Its enactment is the latest in this field and it is the
first northern industrial state to take such a step. Thus,
the state can lay claim to an advanced common law history,
an enlightened statutory background, and a clouded "right
to work" future. Indiana may perhaps not only be the most
appropriate state for examination, but it may also be the
most interesting, because one cannot analyze the Indiana
decisions without inquiring into the wisdom of, or necessity
for, "right to work" legislation.
3- This act was passed March 2, 1957.
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II. WHATEVER ONE MAN MAY Do, ALL MEN MAY Do
On October 31, 1905, Justice Hadley of the Indiana
Supreme Court announced in Karges Furniture Co. v.
Amalgamated Woodworkers,4 that: "Whatever one man
may do, all men may do, and what all may do singly they
may do in concert, if the sole purpose of the combination is
to advance the proper interests of the members, and it is
conducted in a lawful manner.'"15
The Karges case involved a strike with attendant picket-
ing. The contention was made that this activity constituted
a conspiracy and, in any event, was illegal. Justice Hadley
held otherwise, stating that all combinations are not con-
spiracies. He noted that under the American form of
government' all citizens should have a free and equal
chance in life so that each may pursue the path of his
choice, seeking his own betterment as long as the rights
of some other citizen are not infringed.
The court then discussed competition and the "life of
trade," noting that a merchant may lawfully undersell and
attempt to win the customers of his rival even with the
knowledge that the latter's business would be ruined
thereby. He further observed that when a person loses his
property by the acts of his neighbor, as a result of such
activity, it is damnum absque injuria. Thus, it was found
that a strike and picketing were legal even though they
would be necessarily attended with injury and damage
to the employer's business.
An analysis of the Karges case indicates that Justice
Hadley enunciated the following basic ground rules -
the common law labor law of Indiana: (1)the law granted
workmen the right to strike and to use those means and
agencies, not inconsistent with the rights of others, that
14 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905).
15 Id. at 880.
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are necessary to make the strike effective;
(2) making a strike effective would include argument,
persuasion, and such favors and accommodations as the
strikers have within their control because the law will not
deprive diligently applied energy of its just reward;
(3) picketing, which was merely a tool to make the strike
effective and, which therefore was legal, could not only
take place in the vicinity of factories, but the names and
places of residence of non-union employees could be
obtained for the purpose of peaceful visitation;
(4) the exercise of one's rights may cause harm to another,
but if these rights are being legally exercised, the one
harmed has no redress.
In connection with the last point* the court gave the
following example:
To illustrate: A. resides in a populous, residential part
of the city. B. has established a saloon in the same square.
Keeping a saloon there is lawful business. Many of the
neighbors patronize the saloon, and the business pros-
pers. A. disapproves of the business in that place, and
withholds his patronage. He has the absolute right to
withhold it. The neighbors have the absolute right to be-
stow theirs. B. has no absolute right to the patronage of
either, and without patronage will fail in business. Here
it is plain that A. has the absolute right to stand on the
street corner and note all his neighbors who enter and
leave the saloon, hail them on the street, or visit them
at their respective homes, and by argument and persua-
sion (they being willing to listen) endeavor to induce
them to cease their patronage. A.'s object is to make B.'s
business unprofitable and losing, and thus compel him to
move away, and improve the place and attractiveness
of A.'s neighborhood. Now if A. converts all of his
neighbors to his course of conduct by argument, reason,
entreaty, and other fair and proper means, and thereby
effects the suppression of the saloon and financial ruin of
B., it is damnum absque injuria. A. has done nothing but
what the law protects him in doing.16 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the court treated the issue of violence. The facts
16 Id. at 881.
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in the case reflected that while there was no violence on
the picket line as such, the strike was not wholly unattend-
ed by such action. Fourteen of the named defendants,'
members of the union, assaulted employees, and threat-
ened them with violence if they did not quit work in plain-
tiff's factory. The factory was so situated that many persons
going to and from work at other plants would pass the
factory. Crowds would form in the alley and about the
streets of plaintiff's premises and sometimes plaintiff's
workmen would be accosted as they entered or left the
factory. They were called scabs and other opprobrious
names. The strikers formed a small part of these crowds.
While the fourteen individuals who had engaged in
"violence" were enjoined, the court refused to enjoin the
union or any of its other members from its concerted
activity.
Hence, the Karges case, in 1905, was the first pronounce-
ment'8 in Indiana of substantive labor law regarding the
'7 It should be noted that the Karges case also held that unions could not
sue or be sued in their own names, stating that in order "to enforce a right
either for or against them... the names of all the individual members must
be set forth...." Karges did not consider an 1881 enactment, IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 2-220 (Burns 1946), which provides that ".... when the question is one of a
common or general interest of many persons, or where the parties are nu-
merous and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." Two recent cases
have discussed the statute and have ruled that unions may sue or be sued
in representative or class actions without joining each member: Janalene,
Inc. v. Burnett, 220 Ind. 253, 41 N.E2d 942 (1942) (action by one union
member on behalf of all other members against employer for injunction
and other relief relative to breach of contract); Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind.
314, 111 N.E.2d 812 (1953) (action for assault and battery against certain
persons "as representatives of Laundry Workers International Union" held
to be suit against members and property denominated). On the other hand,
it seems that actions solely in the name of a union, as contrasted to repre-
sentative or class actions, are still not proper in Indiana. Thus, in Faultless
Caster Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, CIO, 119
Ind. App. 330, 86 N.E.2d 703 (1949), it was held upon the authority of
Karges that an action in the name of a union as an entity for an injunction
against discharges in violation of a collective bargaining agreement would
not lie, it being noted, however, that Karges was modified to the extent
that it barred representative actions.
38 While Clemitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N.E. 367 (1895), decided
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right to make a strike effective by means such as picket-
ing. The court, in effect, found picketing to be merely one
facet of argument or persuasion - thus anticipating the
free speech cases which were to come more than three
decades later. The case involved violence, but the court
enjoined only those guilty of violence. The statements of
the court concerning "argument" with non-union persons
condoned organizational picketing, and it is to be noted
that the "neighbor" in the court's tavern example, was not
connected with the tavern and hence was engaged in
stranger "argument", i.e., picketing. 9
Karges represents the law of Indiana today, with or
without the anti-injunction statue of the state, passed some
ten years prior to Karges, does not appear to involve a labor union, it
casts considerable light on early Indiana labor policy. There, a discharged
workman proceeded against fellow workmen who, though not engaged in
picketing, had ceased work in order to cause the plaintiff to be discharged.
The court held that there was no duty on the part of the other workmen
"by contract or otherwise" to continue working for their employer, and
hence no actionable wrong had been committed. Although the reason for
the strike is unclear, the court in effect approved a strike for a closed shop,
stating "It would be an anomalous doctrine to hold that, after his fellows
have concluded that he was not a safe or even a desirable companion, they
must continue to work with him, under the penalty of paying damages,"
and concluding that workmen might "without malice or any evil motive,
peaceably and quietly quit work .. . rather than remain at work with one
who is for any reason unsatisfactory to them." Clemitt v. Watson, supra at
368. (Emphasis added.) In reaching its decision, the court discussed con-
spiracy in Indiana and, in general, observed that while many jurisdictions
were still clinging to criminal conspiracy doctrines, conspiracy was not in
itself actionable in Indiana.
19 It should be noted that the "neighbor" was also conducting a boycott.
It is evident that the court was not at all troubled by this fact. Compare
the following quotation from a contemporary treatise which indicates the
tenor of the times:
"Undoubtedly every person has the right to select those upon they
wish to bestow favors or their patronage. But men who will wan-
tonly conspire to boycott inanimate objects, simply because men of
their own trade and calling who did not belong to their associations
built them, are monsters who place themselves outside the pale of
the law and should be exterminated from the face of the earth. They
place themselves on a level of the anarchist, whose religion and
creed is the destruction of all existing systems of property, society,
government and religion." COGLEY, THE LAW OF STreams, LOcKOUTs,
AND LABOR ORGANIZATIoNs 253 (1894). (Emphasis added.)
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28 years later. Nor does a right to work statute affect the
implications of the Karges decision. It is equally important
from a national standpoint because, by way of contrast,
it was decided in an era when the federal and most state
courts were enjoining all picketing.2 ° For example, in
Vegelahn v. Guntner,21 in 1896, Massachusetts enjoined
all picketing, however peaceful. By this time refusals to
work had come to be accepted as legal in those states
where common law or statutes22 had not declared labor
unions illegal conspiracies per se. The paramount issue
was whether the union could use various tools, such as
picketing, to make its strike effective. Some courts actively
attacked picketing, saying as one federal court did: "There
is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any
more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mob-
bing, or lawful lynching."'3 Others found peaceful picket-
ing legal, but this finding of legality was articulated with
tongue in cheek and generally was not decisive of the out-
20 See 3 & 4 COMMONS & Gn.aroP, DocuMENTARy HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTrAL SOCIETY 59 (1910).
21 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896). Justice Holmes and Chief Justice
Fields dissented in separate opinions. Holmes, taking what he termed "the
less popular view of the law," objected to the majority's holding that two
pickets were an objectionable number and to the breadth of the decree
which forbade the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs business
"by any scheme ... organized for the purpose of . . . preventing any per-
son or persons who now are or may hereafter be . . . desirous of entering
the [plaintiff's employment] from entering it." Id. at 1080. He concluded,
as per Karges, that (1) there is no basic distinction or difference between
individual action and concerted action causing otherwise lawful activity
to be unlawful, and (2) using an example similar to that of the tavern
keeper used in Karges, that the mere fact that injury will result to one does
not make another's lawful activities unlawful, particularly if such damage
results from activities beneficial to the active party. Chief Justice Fields
concluded that malice is not a proper test of whether an injunction should
issue but that intimidation and force might be enjoined.
2 See, e.g., IND. REV. STAT. § 2126 (1881), repealed, Ind. Sess. Laws 1889,
c. 181, § 1.
23 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905).
See also Otis Steel Co. v. Local 218, Iron Molders' Union, 110 Fed. 698
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1901); Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 131
Ga. 336, 62 S.E. 236 (1908); Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply
Co., 110 ll. App. 61 (1903), af'd 216 111. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905), which com-
pared picketing with welfare.
[Vol. X.XXII
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come of the case. If the picketing was extremely peaceful,
the courts would philosophize on mental intimidation and
coercion' or purpose,'s thus drawing fine lines as to the
limits of picketing; if violence occurred, it was relatively
easy to state that peaceful picketing was legal, but the
circumstances in the case at bar required legal condemna-
tion - not only of the violence but of all picketing.2
This was the era which surrounded the Karges case.2 7
Yet Karges, in a period of intense confusion and prejudice,
anticipated the federal" and its own state anti-injunction
legislation.' Moreover, while other states were actively
seeking legal doctrines to curtail the employees' growing
24 See, e.g., Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159
Fed. 500 (C.C.D. Nev. 1908); Allis Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150
Fed. 155 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1906), modifted, 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908); O'Neil
v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 Atl. 843 (1897).
25 See, e.g., DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317 (1911) (pur-
pose to compel discharge of foreman); W. P. Davis Mach. Co. v. Robinson,
41 Misc. 329, 84 N.Y. Supp. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (purpose to interfere with
and injure employer's business). But see W. & A. Fletcher Co. v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, 55 Atl. 1077 (N.J. Eq. 1903) (purpose to cause
workmen not to take employment with employer).
26 See e.g., Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264 (C.C.N.D.
m. 1901).
27 Yet to come, were further setbacks for labor in the Supreme Court
cases of United States v. Adair, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (holding unconstitu-
tional that part of the 1898 Erdman Act which made it criminal for officers
of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of membership
in a labor organization); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (sustaining,
under the Sherman Act, an action for damages resulting from a boycott by
a union); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (re-
versing a contempt citation of union leaders but on technical grounds);
and Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (in sub-
stance giving legal effect to "yellow dog" contracts). The Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 7S0 (1914), was still to be passed, and this much heralded Magna
Carta was yet to be destroyed in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
Further restrictions by the Supreme Court in American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921); Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921); the Coronado cases, 259 U.S. 344 (1924) and 268 U.S.
295 (1925); and the Bedford Stone case, 274 U.S. 37 (1927), were from one
to two decades away from becoming history.
28 Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1952); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (1952); National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
amended in 1947 by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 61
STAT. 136, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1952).
29 Iw. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-501---40-513 (Burns 1952).
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desire to organize and bargain, the Indiana Supreme Court
not only accepted the then contemporary industrial meta-
morphosis, but enunciated its common law principles
which are equally applicable today. The contrast between
the holding of the Indiana court and that of other forums
is marked. The reason for this divergence is not as obvious,
however; no suggested answer is susceptible of precise
analysis, for at best the motivation lies not in measurable
standards but in subjective beliefs formed by heredity,
environment, exposure, and social consciousness, the sum
total of which may be termed an "outlook on life."
30
The description and appraisal of a particular outlook at
a particular time will vary, but notwithstanding such
variance, a specific "outlook" prevailed in Indiana in the
period circumscribing the Karges case and this apparently
also was shared by the Indiana legislature. Elsewhere,
there were still conspiracy statutes which declared that a
concerted refusal to work was a crime.3 ' Moreover, where
a few courts were inclined to recognize the rights of work-
men and visualize their problems, the legislatures gen-
erally were not, and the converse was equally true.32 In
Indiana, however, by an 1879 statute, laborers were given
the status of preferred creditors.33 In 1885 it was declared
30 In analyzing the motivations of judges and the attendant impact upon
decisional law, Justice Cardozo made the following observation:
"There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose
to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction
to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more
than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recog-
nize and cannot name, have been tugging at them-inherited in-
stincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant
is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, a sense in James's
phrase of "the total push and pressure of the cosmos," which, when
reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall
fall. In this mental background every problem finds its setting."
CAnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDicIAL PROCESS 12-13 (1921).
33 See 2 CoMMsONs, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 191 (1921);
MARTn, MOaR LAw OF LABOR UNIONS 267-80 (1910).
32 See, e.g., statutes and cases cited in FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION, 146 n. 52 (1930).
83 IND. AmN. STAT. § 40-111 (Burns 1952).
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illegal to import aliens to perform labor services of any
kind. 4 In 1889 it was made unlawful for an employee to
waive or for an employer to coerce an employee to waive
payment for services in money,35 or to purchase at a
particular place or at a particular price.36 Black-listing was
outlawed in 1889, 7 and the eight-hour day was effectuated
in the same year,38 with a proviso that it was permissible
to work more than eight hours provided the employees
received "extra compensation."39 By 1899 it was made a
crime for an employer to attach a fine against an em-
ployee's wages or to change his wages without notice."
In 1901 a minimum wage of twenty cents per hour was
established,4  and a statute leveled against importing police
for use in strike breaking was passed in 1905.'
34 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2001 (Burns 1952). This act, operating like a high
tariff, was designed to protect and enhance wage levels and employment.
35 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-117 (Burns 1952).
36 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-118---40-121 (Burns 1952). These enactments
were designed to attack the all too common practice of employers forcing
employees to buy at company stores at prices established by the employer.
This was often coupled with the building of a company town where em-
ployees were forced by circumstances or otherwise to purchase housing,
food, clothing and, in fact, everything from the employer at unreasonable
prices.
37 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-302 (Burns 1952). This section was held invalid
as to voluntary quitters because they were not encompassed in the title
of the act. Wabash R.R. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N.E. 1003 (1904). See also
IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-301 (Burns 1952).
38 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-401-40-404 (Burns 1952). It should be noted that
Ind. Laws 1901, c. 122, which fixed a minimum wage for unskilled laborers
on public works was declared unconstitutional in Street v. Varney Elec.
Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N.E. 895 (1903). There has been considerable
Indiana litigation in this area.
39 See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-521 (Burns 1948) (child labor); IND. AN.
STAT. § 40-1112---40-1114 (Burns 1952) (releases by injured employee); and
IND. A=n. STAT. §§ 40-1101-40-1111 (Burns 1952) (an early employer's liabil-
ity law).
40 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-116 (Burns 1952). See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-
202--40-203 (Burns 1952) (prohibitions against assigning wages); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 40-901, 40-903-40-904 (Burns 1952) (employment of children and
women regulated); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1014 (Burns 1952) (prohibiting dis-
crimination by employers against "any person" or "class of labor").
41 Ind. Sess, Laws 1901, c. 122, § 1. See also Inn. ANN. STAT. § 40-204
(Burns 1952) (limitation on employer repayment of, and owing money to,
employees).
42 InD. ANw. STAT. § 10-4905 (Burns 1956).
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These statutes, as well as those subsequently enacted,43
recognized human values and were designed, at least in
part, to secure their protection. It is noteworthy that many
of the rights of employees and labor unions, which today
are taken for granted, were codified or created by the
legislature at a very early date in Indiana's industrial
history44 and during a period when understanding in other
states was clouded by the traditional hostility.
A. The Little Wagner Act
Following congressional passage of the Wagner Act in
1935, several states passed similar legislation which be-
came known as "little Wagner Acts."45 Indiana did not
do so. But in 1893, forty-two years earlier, its legislature
had passed an act "to protect employees and guarantee
their rights to belong to labor organizations."46 The statute
reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any individual, or member of
any firm, agent, officer, or employee of any company or
corporation to prevent employees from forming, joining
and belonging to any lawful labor organization, and
any such individual member, agent, officer or employee
that coerces or attempts to coerce employees by discharg-
ing or threatening to discharge from their employ or the
employ of any firm, company or corporation because of
their connection with such lawful labor organization,
and any officer or employer, to exact [who exacts] a
pledge from workingmen that they will not become
43 See, e.g., Ind. Laws 1915, c. 118, §§ 1-10, repealed by Ind. Laws 1937,
c. 34, § 30 (arbitration of labor controversies); IND. AXH. STAT. §§ 40-2301-
40-2306 (Burns 1952) (Fair Employment Practices Act, dealing with racial
and other discrimination in employment); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401---40-
2415 (Burns 1952) (Arbitration of Public Utilities Disputes).
44 This early legislation is at least in part responsible for the early
growth and strength of labor unions in Indiana because it not only added
legal efficacy to union demands for certain conditions but lent moral sup-
port as well. Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that this same early
strength and activity prompted at least some of the early legislation dis-
cussed.
45 See note 9 supra.
46 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4906 (Burns 1956).
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members of a labor organization as a consideration of
employment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon
conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction,
shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred
dollars [$100], or imprisoned for not more than six
[6] months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
This legislation is still in effect today, but it is relatively
unknown, perhaps because many feel that it has been
overshadowed by the anti-injunction statute of 1933."7
However, it cannot be overlooked that the 1893 act recog-
nizes certain rights of individuals to organize themselves
into labor organizations and to be protected against dis-
crimination and recrimination in this respect. How differ-
ent is that from the federal and state Wagner acts of 1935
and following? To be sure, these latter acts were more,
comprehensive and not only recognized the right of self-
organization but also specifically guaranteed rights of
collective bargaining.4" The Indiana act recognized the.
right to organize and protected that right by providing not
merely civil penalties, as in the Wagner Act, but stringent.
criminal penalties - and all this in 1893."°
Ill. PARTIAL CLARIFICATION OF THE CLASsIc DOCTRINES.
The generation following the Karges decision was
plagued with two legal concepts which had become firmly
47 IND. Ax . STAT. §§ 40-501--40-513 (Burns 1952).
48 See section seven of the Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
157 (1952), which provided:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. .. ."
49 It is also significant that this 1893 enactment prohibited "yellow dog"'
contracts by subjecting any employer who "exacts a pledge from working-
men that they will not become members of a labor organization as a con-
sideration of employment" to the same penalties. A similar provision against.
"yellow dog" contracts is contained in section three of the anti-injunctiont
act of 1933, IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-503 (Burns 1952).
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embedded in American jurisprudence: (1) conspiracy
and (2) the application of "property law" to labor matters.
True, some courts had determined that acts performed
by more than one were not illegal per se, but often mere
lip service was paid to this principle and conspiracy
continued to be found in one form or another.
A. The Concept of Conspiracy
Conspiracy revolves around the presence of one of two
elements: either illegal purpose or illegal means. Sig-
nificantly, while perhaps without articulate deliberateness,
the Indiana courts continue to follow the lead established
by the Karges case and removed the application of the
conspiracy doctrine in labor relations by holding, in effect,
that the purpose of labor union activity was not the factor
to be looked to, but rather that the means should be
scrutinized merely to determine the presence or absence
of violence. Shaughnessey v. Jordan° and Scofes v. Hel-
mar51 are illustrative of this trend. The issues involved
in these cases are common to many labor cases today in all
jurisdictions.
In the Shaughnessey case, decided in 1916, the trial
court enjoined all picketing and awarded damages. The
dispute involved a closed shop demand. The plaintiff in-
50 184 Ind. 499, 111 N.E. 622 (1916).
51 205 Ind. 596, 187 N.E. 662 (1933). In this same era there were a few
cases dealing with such matters as city anti-picketing ordinances, Thomas v.
Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550 (1924); Watters v. Indianapolis, 191
Ind. 671, 134 N.E. 482 (1922), discussed in text at 593-94, notes 80-83, inra,
and internal affairs of labor unions, McNichols v. Int'l Typographical Union, 63
F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1933); Howard v. Weissman, 31 F.2d 689 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 280 U.S. 575 (1929); McNichols v. Int'l Typographical Union, 21 F.2d 497
(7th Cir. 1927); Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929); Gard-
ner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N.E. 704 (1920). See also Davis v. State,
200 Ind. 88, 99-100, 161 N.E. 375, 379-80 (1928), rev'd in part on other grounds
in 205 Ind. 141, 186 N.E. 293, 295 (1933), a criminal case in which the court
considered the Karges and Shaugnessey cases in relation to violent con-
duct; Armstrong v. United States, 18 F.2d 371 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 534 (1927).
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voked the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,52
as well as the 1907 Indiana Anti-Trust Act.53 The court
noted that section one of the state anti-trust act stated that
the act was not intended to repeal, modify, or limit any
powers, rights, or privileges which existed at the time of
the passage of the act. It stated that the Karges case was de-
cided in 1905, and accordingly the 1907 act did not ".
limit or control any right of a member, or members, of a
labor union, to do what was declared lawful in the Karges
case.'
51
The facts of the case reveal that strangers to the dis-
pute, hired pickets whom the courts described as "profes-
sional pickets," were being utilized in an organizational
strike to compel the plaintiff to unionize its foundry.
Some violence was alleged and plaintiffs claimed further
that they had suffered financial damage.
The conspiracy issue was brought to the fore in full
regalia because, while admitting that individuals could
quit work, the plaintiff contended that when a group did
this for the purpose of compelling the employer to employ
only union men, then such action took on the form of a
conspiracy.
In reversing the decree of the trial court, the court noted
that the defendants were enjoined from:
... peaceably or otherwise continuing the strike for the
purpose of unionizing the shop, from peaceably per-
suading anyone from entering or continuing in appellees'
service, and from peacefully congregating on the side-
walks and streets adjoining or adjacent to appellees' place
of business, and from picketing in any manner the place
or the residence of the employes.5 5
The court stated that ". . . these provisions, and possibly
52 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-33 (1952).
53 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-101-23-133 (Burns 1950).
54 Shaugnessey v. Jordan, 184 Ind. 499, 111 N.E. 622, 626 (1916).
5 5I/bid.
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others, are erroneous.""6
The Shaughnessey case is somewhat strapped with
evidentiary questions and procedural points. The import-
ant aspect is, however, that the court refused to accept any
theory of conspiracy or anti-trust violation as applied to
labor unions. In addition, in line with Karges, it stated
that an injunction decree outlawing peaceable picketing
around or near the premises of the employer or the
residence of employees for organizational purposes to
obtain a closed shop, was erroneous.
In the Scofes case a request was made by the defendant
union to have the plaintiff restaurant owner sign a closed
shop agreement. When the plaintiff refused, two of the
plaintiff's employees who had joined the union struck;
others remained in his employ. Picketing was commenced
with signs reading, "This restaurant is Unfair to Organized
Labor." The plaintiff's delivery of supplies was foreclosed
and the patronage of many former customers was lost.
Although there was no violence as such, two em-
ployees who had continued to work for the plaintiff were
accosted and verbally abused. In addition, customers were
stopped on the street and talked with, after which they
refused to enter the restaurant. On one occasion a picket
"grabbed" a customer.
Thus, the case raised question of violence, intimidation,
language on picket signs, refusal of customers and suppliers
to cross a picket line, and generally the rights of unions to
picket for organizational purposes, including a demand that
all plaintiff's employees presently and in the future become
members of the union. As regards the latter issue, the
court, again relying on Karges, held that the object legally
justified picketing if lawfully conducted even though the
picketing causes pecuniary loss to the business.
56 Ibid. The court reversed because of errors in the admission of evi-
dence, even though it believed there was evidence from which the trial
court could have found violence in the picketing.
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The holding and analysis of the court in the Scofes case
set forth the proposition that the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of picketing is dependent upon the conduct of the
pickets themselves, not the type of signs used or whether
the purpose of the picketing was to obtain a closed shop,
a wage demand, or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment. In other words, the sole issue was whether the
picketing was peaceable or whether violence was used. As
regards violence, the court found that even in peaceable
picketing "irresponsible individuals" may be guilty of
misconduct in isolated instances. It stated that this conduct
was likely not to recur and certainly would not benefit
the union. The court concluded that, in any event, whether
or not certain acts might be placed in the category of
violence and whether or not they were likely to recur
would depend upon the circumstances in each case. Ap-
parently pursuant to Karges, only acts of violence were to
be enjoined, and the picketing itself could continue if
carried out in peaceable fashion.
The Shaughnessey and Scofes cases are indeed interest-
ing. Cases which would have supported and strengthened
the propositions announced by the courts were overlooked.
For example, the case of Clemitt v. Watso 57 could have
been relied upon by the court in Scofes. In the Clemitt case,
the court upheld a refusal to work in an effort to secure
what was, in effect, a closed shop. The Scofes case involved
that very issue. Similarly, Shaughnessey, although in-
volved in procedural and evidentiary points, is in accord
with Karges and Scofes. Yet while Scofes cites Karges, it
completely overlooks Shaughnessey, and neither case
makes any reference to the "little Wagner Act" of 1893
which would have at least been helpful in indicating the
legislative intent. Moreover, indicative of the independent
development of the judicial and legislative approach, one
finds that while Scofes was decided on November 21, 1933,
57 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N.E. 367 (1895). See note 18 supra.
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it makes no reference to the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act
which became effective May 22, 1933. Interestingly, how-
ever, both bodies arrived at the same conclusions, one by
interpreting and determining the common law and the
other by legislative enactment.
Thus, this period in the development of Indiana labor
law, while perhaps not articulate in legal theory, achieved
results which were enlightened and clearly in advance of
the times. Shaughnessey and Scofes denied the conspiracy
rationale even though both cases involved closed shop de-
mands, one of the most extreme of union aims. This
"purpose" was singularly attacked as being illegal, par-
ticularly where accompanied by picketing by nonem-
ployees. The courts in Shaughnessey and Scofes were not
disturbed by these factors, however, since they viewed
labor disputes as a form of economic rivalry, with each side
attempting to benefit its position. The victor could legally
prevail, unless the legislature decreed otherwise or lest an
ordinary tort such as violence - which was always pro-
tected against long before the advent of labor unions -
was committed.
B. Property Concepts
The courts could not have arrived at the stated results
without an awareness that they were dealing with "eco-
nomic relations" and not "property" concepts. This is per-
haps best portrayed during this period in Gasaway v. Bord-
erland Coal Corp.,5" decided in 1921 " by the United States
58 278 Fed. 56 (7th Cir. 1921).
59 It should be noted that the Gasaway case was decided before the
doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins [Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)] was established. The general effect of this doctrine is, of course,
that federal courts must utilize state law in deciding matters of substance
but may use federal law in resolving procedural issues. Since the federal
courts were not compelled to apply state law at the time of Gasaway, it is
not clear whether and to what extent Gasaway, or any federal decisions
prior to 1938, are controlling authority within a given state.
[Vol. XXXII
5EDERAL LAW IN THE LABOR EQUATION
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Indiana dis-
trict court had granted an injunction prohibiting not only
all types of picketing, but also the utilization of the dues
check-off system under the theory that the funds collected
were being used to organize the plaintiff's coal mines.
The case involved a strike by the United Mine Workers
in an attempt to organize certain coal producers. The major
portion of the industry was organized and the union had an
agreement with the already organized producers which
provided for the check-off of union dues. The plaintiff con-
tended that this money was being used to organize its own
mines, and accordingly, that a conspiracy existed between
the organized employers and the mine workers' union,
which violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The court
of appeals held that the district court had improvidently
exercised its discretion. It noted that the suit was not an
indictment to punish conspirators for their crimes, nor was
it a bill in the public interest to enjoin or dissolve an un-
lawful conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade;
rather it was stated to be a familiar action to protect prop-
erty from injury due to continuing direct trespasses. The
court noted then that any decree which restrained the
unionization or attempted unionization of the non-union
miners, or the use of lawful union argument, speeches,
appeals to labor personnel, and peaceable persuasion was
generally invalid. Recognizing that each side had conflict-
ing interests and, in effect, that each could attempt to
secure the prevalence of its opinion by "publications,
speeches and personal persuasion," it also observed that
laborers may bargain for a closed union shop and em-
ployers may bargain for a closed non-union shop. The
court said that the plaintiff had no greater right to a
decree suppressing lawful action of the union than the
union would have to a decree suppressing similar lawful
action in support of the employer's position for a non-union
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shop. The case was reversed with direction to modify the
decree and to limit it to direct acts of trespass, i.e., violence,
use of firearms and attempted physical seizure of the mines.
The union dues check-off procedure was allowed to stand.
Thus Gasaway touches upon the difficulty and confusion
which exists in the application of basic principles of law in
labor-management relations.
The "property" concept was well established in Ameri-
can jurisprudence from its very inception, and, as a result,
where a court saw fit to condemn certain activity, acting
upon prevailing sociological concepts, it would utilize a
theory of protection of the "property" rights of the com-
plainant. Running through the earlier cases is the ex-
tension of this "property" concept to all types of labor
activities. This, coupled with the conspiracy doctrine, was
all that a court needed to rationalize its decision. In other
words, an employer undoubtedly suffers injury by a reason
of a strike or picketing. Absent any contractual relation-
ship, this injury would fall in the general category of a
tort. Obviously, a strike not involving violence could not
be a physical tort or wrong, and, therefore, the courts
would hasten to the conclusion that this was a wrong to
the complainant's "property" rights, because for every
wrong there must be a remedy.
The broad utilization of "property" concepts overlooked
any application of damnum absque injuria and failed to
recognize the scope of the relative duties of the parties.
Only if this legal expression is viewed in terms of injuries
to a relationship, can the duty be defined with its various
privileges and exceptions. In the early period the relational
interest and the relative duties and rights had not been
developed. The field of defamation was new and the right
or inierest of an individual to privacy was unknown. These
are also relational rights and interests, and labor law falls
into the field of economic relations, except when actual
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trespass, such as a sit-down strike or seizure, is involved.
The "property" concept should have no application what-
soever. Without express enunciation, the court in the
Gasaway case so held. It noted that both sides had a right
to compete through the exercise of economic pressure and
thereby attempt to obtain what they believe appropriate.
The court could have articulated further and said in this
vein that the only applicable doctrines are those revolving
around the economic relations of the parties and the duty
to each in such respect. Thus, absent statutes defining the
allowable area of economic conflict, here is no duty on
the part of a labor union not to interfere with an employer,
anymore than there is a duty on the part of the employer
not to resist a labor union when each is peaceably seeking
to accomplish something which will benefit its respective
economic position. Certainly economic injury may well
result. But to the extent that there is no duty, then there
is no actionable wrong and any harm is damnum absque
injuria.
IV. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE
Indiana passed its anti-injunction act on May 22, 1933.' °
It was not only similar to, but, in fact, identical to the
federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.6 Indiana was not unique
in this respect, for many states had passed or were passing
little Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 2
What was the purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
Perhaps it could be assumed that everyone interested in
labor relations today knows the purpose and that such a
question would be superfluous. However, an examination
of decisions in some jurisdictions indicates that oftentimes
60 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-501--40-513 (Burns 1952).
6 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
62 See note 12 supra.
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it is helpful to look back to the original referent to analyze
underlying policy and motivation behind a legislative en-
actment.
In 1898 the Erdman Act was passed,' designed to out-
law black-listing and "yellow dog" contracts, and to curtail
discrimination by railroads against union members. Con-
gress, however, was not successful, because in 1908 in the
case of Adair v. United States,64 the act was held uncon-
stitutional as a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
The Erdman Act did not deal with abuse of the injunc-
tive process. Congress attempted to resolve that problem
as well as the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
to labor organizations, when it passed the Clayton Act65
in 1914. Section 20 of that act seemed to deprive the fed-
eral courts of power to grant injunctions in labor disputes.
However, in 1921 the Supreme Court, in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering,66 held that a strike and a sympathetic
refusal to handle goods could not be lawful unless made so
by the Clayton Act. Thus, to the extent that the Clayton
Act supplemented the Sherman Act, it was merely restat-
ing the judicial interpretation of what acts of labor were
legal. The activity involved was held to be an illegal com-
bination. The union activities, although peaceful and inur-
ing to the benefit of the union members, were found to be
violations of the Sherman Act, even as amended by the
Clayton Act. The Court stated that the Clayton Act failed
to authorize this type of secondary activity, and similarly,
that it did not take labor out of the field of "conspiracy." A
direct relationship of employer and employee was held to
be contemplated by section 20 of the Clayton Act so that
the restrictive provisions of that section concerning in-
63 30 STAT. 424 (1898).
64 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
65 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952).
66 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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junctions applied only ". . . to those who are proximately
and substantially concerned as parties to an actual dispute
respecting the terms or conditions of their own employ-
ment, past, present or prospective."6 7
This case, together with other highly publicized decisions
on the federal level, and the consistent and growing use of
injunctions granted by the federal courts,68 led to the
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. To the extent that
the federal act and the Indiana act were identical when
passed, and in so far as there were no Indiana common
law decisions which condoned the abuses which the statute
meant to correct, the purpose of an anti-injunction statute
can best be determined by examining what the federal act
intended to accomplish.
Initially, both acts set forth certain procedural restric-
tions to be followed. These include findings of facts and
the posting of bond before an injunction can be granted.
The balance of the statutes deal with substantive pro-
tections. The fourth section outlines nine types of activity
which cannot be enjoined,69 while section five of the act
conclusively removes the conspiracy theory from the field
of labor relations by stating that no court shall issue
an injunction upon the ground that those participating in
a labor dispute are engaged "in an unlawful combination
or conspiracy because of the doing in concert" what they
might be able to do singly.70 Section six 7 removes the
blanket responsibility of members or officers of the union,
or the union itself, for unlawful acts of the officers, mem-
67 Id. at 472.
68 See FRANF :TFuR AND GREENE, Tim LABOR INJUNCTION 148, 165-169.
See also Armstrong v. U.S., 18 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1927), where the defendant
was found guilty of contempt for violation of an injunction against per-
suading employees to violate "yellow dog" agreements, the court finding
that non-employees were not within the scope of the Clayton Act.
69 See IN. ANN. STAT. § 40-504 (Burns 1952).
70 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-505 (Burns 1952).
71 IwD. ANN. STAT. § 40-506 (Burns 1952).
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bers or agents, "'. .. except upon clear proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of
ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof." 2
Section 13 of the act defines a "labor dispute," and to
overcome the result of the Duplex case, elaborately sets
forth relationships between parties who might have a
"direct or indirect" interest in disputes irrespective of
whether the parties stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.
In 1938 the United States Supreme Court passed upon
the definition of a labor dispute in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner &
Co. 3 In that case, which arose in Wisconsin, the union re-
quested that the employer require its employees to become
members of the union as a condition of continued em-
ployment. The union had no members working for the em-
ployer and although the employer notified the employees
that they were free to join the union, they declined to do
so. Picketing began and the district court issued an in-
junction, finding no labor dispute. This finding was af-
firmed on appeal, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding
that the district court was restrained from issuing an in-
junction by reason of both the Wisconsin labor laws and
section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The court
specifically pointed out that "stranger" picketing was
permissible because by statutory definition a labor dis-
pute existed ". . . regardless of whether or not the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. '
72 This was designed to overcome the cases of Coronado Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) , Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915);
and Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
73 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
74 Ibid. at 329. One of the best discussions of the underlying purpose
and intent of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is found in Milkwagon Drivers'
Union, AFL v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 102 (1940).
There, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, stated:
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, is the culmination of
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One year previous to the Lauf decision, the Supreme
Court had considered the Wisconsin Anti-Injunction Act
in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.' As in the Lauf
case, the union was engaged in stranger picketing, and in
addition, the purpose of the picketing was to cause Senn,
a tile-laying contractor, to cease doing the work himself
and to hire union employees. The issue was whether or
not the fourteenth amendment required that a state pro-
tect against such picketing, and the court held that the
means which the statute authorizes - picketing and pub-
licity - clearly are not prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. Equally significant is the fact that the Senn
case is basically the forerunner of the Supreme Court cases
dealing with free speech, because the Court observed that
union members ".... might, without special statutory au-
thorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dis-
pute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the federal
Constitution."76
a bitter political, social and economic controversy extending over
half a century. Hostility to 'government by injunction' had become
the rallying slogan of many and varied groups. Indeed, as early
as 1914 Congress had responded to a widespread public demand
that the Sherman Act be amended, and had passed the Clayton Act,
itself designed to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue
injunctions in cases involving labor disputes. But the proponents
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act felt that the jurisdictional limitations
of the Clayton Act had been largely nullified by judicial decision.
.. .As an example of the judicial interpretation of the Clayton
Act which the Committee said was 'responsible in part for this
agitation for further legislation,' the Committee referred to the
cases of Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, Ameri-
can Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,
and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Associa-
tion, 274 U.S. 37....
"Whether or not one agrees with the committees that the cited
cases constituted an unduly restricted interpretation of the Clayton
Act, one must agree that the committees and the Congress made
abundantly clear their intention that what they regarded as the
misinterpretation of the Clayton Act should not be repeated in the
construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act... " 311 U.S. at 102-103.
75 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
76 Id. at 478.
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A. Codification - Not Innovation
The last quoted provision of the Senn case is equally ap-
plicable to the effect of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act on
Indiana common law. No statutory authorization was
necessary to permit the activities described by the statute,
for, from a substantive standpoint, Karges, Clemitt,
Shaughnessey, and Scofes covered most of the situations
described in the anti-injunction act. Moreover, the Indiana
act of 1893 expressed the legislative policy of the state:
the individual had the right to organize and to form labor
unions. To be sure, the 1893 act was not as elaborate as
the anti-injunction act, but when read in the light of the
Indiana cases discussed herein, it becomes very clear
that with or without the anti-injunction act, workmen in
Indiana have the right to organize, strike, and picket. To
the extent that they use peaceful means, and so long as
they act in their own self-interest, the purpose of the pick-
eting, the language on the signs, and the fact that the
pickets are "strangers" are all immaterial. While the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was necessary to curb federal
abuses and hence was intended to reverse a trend, the
Indiana act merely codified its own common law, which
was distinctly different from the federal treatment and that
of most states.
The Kokomo case" upheld the constitutionality of the
Indiana Anti-Injunction Act. In that case the union insti-
tuted a declaratory judgment action, attacking the validity
of the city's anti-picketing ordinance. The ordinance out-
lawed peaceful acts as well as those connected with vio-
lence and the court held the ordinance irreconcilable and
inconsistent with the provisions of the anti-injunction
statute. In reaching its decision, the court discussed the
77 Local 26, Nat'l Bros. of Operative Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5
NE.2d 624 (1937).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act and similar Illinois legislation" and
then concluded: "The 1933 act, the same as the Illinois
statute does not attempt to legalize that which would other-
wise be illegal."'79
B. The State Preempts The Cities
To a large extent, the present inquiry into state law was
prompted by ramifications of federal supremacy. How-
ever, supremacy takes forms other than federalism - the
states too have a sphere of supremacy. But whether federal
or state, the clarification process apparently cannot be ac-
complished in one step. In 1924, in Thomas v. Indian-
apolis,"o the Indiana Supreme Court upheld an Indian-
apolis ordinance which prohibited peaceful as well as
violent picketing. 1 The Thomas case followed the Karges
case, but it pointed out that Karges was "speaking of
what was lawful in the absence of any legislation upon the
subject, and no legislative action upon the subject was
considered."' 2 The court in Thomas apparently viewed the
Indianapolis ordinance as the "legislative action" con-
templated, and hence not subject to Karges, for it stated:
This ordinance does not prevent employees from
striking nor does it prevent them from presenting their
side of the controversy with their employer to others. It
78 The court noted that while most courts had formerly disapproved
picketing, striking and other collective activity, ".. . [T]he past few years
have witnessed a decided change in public opinion, legislative enactments,
and judicial construction" Id. at 628. The court went on to illustrate its
point by reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Indiana anti-in-
junction act, noting that, "There is nothing in the [Indiana anti-injunction]
act to abridge the freedom of speech, the right to assemble in a peaceable
manner and to consult for their common good, nor does it grant to any
citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Id. at 629.
79 Local 26, Nat'l Bros. of Operative Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72,
5 N.E.2d 624, 628 (1937).
80 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550 (1924).
83 It would appear that a prohibition against unpeaceful or violent
picketing would be unnecessary, for there have always been remedies,
both criminal and civil, for violence.
82 Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550, 551 (1924).
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prohibits some acts that are inherently wrong, [i.e.,
violence] and other acts which are not wrong within
themselves, are regulated and only prohibited from being
committed under such circumstances and in such places
as may result in public disorder and cause breaches of
the peace.83
The Kokomo case distinguished the Thomas case, ob-
serving that the city of Kokomo had the right to legislate
but since ".... the Indiana Legislature has spoken upon the
subject, the [Thomas] case is no longer controlling, and it
must be held that the ordinance in question is in conflict
with the expressed policy of the state upon that subject." 4
Thus the Karges to Thomas to Kokomo tandem is indeed
filled with irony. Karges announced the common law of
Indiana in the absence of legislation. Thomas found that
municipal ordinances were included within the type of
legislation contemplated. It took state legislation, how-
ever, to establish that the content of such municipal ordi-
nances was not in keeping with the announced policy of
the legislature. Thus one legislative enactment of a larger
political body obviated the effects of a smaller one. It was
perhaps in this area - the subordination of municipal
legislation - that the anti-injunction act, irrespective of
federal questions,'n made affirmative changes. The state
83 Id. at 551. The court relied upon Watters v. Indianapolis, 191 Ind. 671,
134 N.E. 482 (1922), which involved an ordinance that banned the carrying
of "any banner, placard, advertisement or handbill" upon "any public
street, sidewalk, alley or other public place." The defendant conceded that
the city could pass such an ordinance and attacked the constitutionality of
the exercise of this power, claiming the exercise to be arbitrary and un-
reasonable. The court held that there was no unreasonable classification
and that the defendant was not denied "the right of 'free interchange of
thought and opinion,' or 'the right to speak, write or think freely."' How-
ever, in view of the Kokomo case, Watters, like Thomas, has no vitality
today.
84 Local 26, Nat'l Bros. of Operative Potters v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. at 81,
5 NME.2d 627 (1937).
85 Compare the attitude expressed by the United States Supreme Court
toward municipal ordinances during this period. In 1940, in Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, 310 U.S. 106 (1940), the Supreme Court held invalid on its face a
California municipal ordinance which made it unlawful "to loiter.., or to
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having preempted the field, municipalities could no longer
restrict peaceful picketing. The state, though nationally
subordinate, was locally supreme.
V. PARALLEL LINES: THE JUDIcIARY AND LEGISLATURE
It has previously been noted that judicial development
was independent of that of the legislature. This observa-
tion is illustrated by Vonderschmitt v. McGuire,, which
makes no reference to the anti-injunction statute which
had been enacted two years earlier. The Indiana Appellate
Court found that peaceful picketing in front of a theatre
proclaiming with a sign that the theatre was "unfair to
organized labor" was not enjoinable. The complainant al-
leged that he owned the property to the center line of the
street and apparently claimed that the picketing consti-
tuted a trespass. The court rejected this contention, hold-
ing that the public had the right to travel upon the street
and citing the Scofes case as authority for the lawfulness
of peaceful picketing. The Vonderschmitt case, like Scofes,
was decided subsequent to the passage of the anti-injunc-
tion statute, yet the statute was not mentioned even though
the activity in question was as permissible under the
statute as under common law.
Glover v. Parsons' is similarly illustrative of the prevail-
ing dichotomy. There, non-striking employees obtained an
injunction against "threats and acts of violence and intimi-
dation, and abusive language" on the part of the striking
employees. While it seems clear that the findings of the
picket . .. or to carry, show or display any banner, transparency, badge
or sign ... in the vicinity of any works, or factory, or an place of busi-
ness or employment for the purpose of inducing ... any person to refrain
from entering. . ." The court held that the ordinance abridged the free
speech guarantees of the Constitution and was not a proper exercise of
the police power.
86 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 NE. 585 (1935).
87 103 Ind. App. 561, 9 N.E2d 109 (1937).
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trial court were framed within the requirements of the
anti-injunction act, the court made no reference to the act
in affirming the granting of the injunction. Parenthetically,
however, it stated that: ". . . this case is not a dispute be-
tween the employer and employees. The employer is not
a party herein. The dispute is solely between two groups of
employees....""
The Glover decision is not treated by the reporting sys-
tems as a labor case. Perhaps this is because no reference
is made to the anti-injunction act. Nevertheless, the court
was constrained to note that:
There is no question whatever presented in this appeal
as to the right to strike, or the right to picket peacefully,
or the right to bargain collectively. The plain and simple
question first presented is whether or not there is some
competent evidence to sustain the trial court in its
finding. We think there was.8 9
Glover involved violence and nothing more. This of
course, always was enjoinable. However, the confusion of
the court and perhaps the parties is worthy of note. The
court accepted the principles of Karges without saying
so or without citing any authority. The trial court framed
an injunction decree within the necessary requirements of
the anti-injunction act, but the appellate court did not re-
fer to the statute; it merely pointed out that the dispute
was between employees alone and did not involve an em-
ployer. Perhaps the appellate court believed that this
statement was necessary, but if it had considered the anti-
injunction act, such a statement would be meaningless be-
cause the act expressly includes within the definition of a
labor dispute, matters involving "employees of the same
employer... whether (or not) such dispute is.. . between
... employees.., and employees .... , In any event, the
88 Id. at 110.
89 Ibid.
90 IND. AN-N. STAT. § 40-513 (a) (Burns 1952).
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violence in the Glover case was sufficiently clear to cause
the trial court to restrain such conduct. Beyond that, the
decision, except from a standpoint of recognizing the right
to strike and picket, is relatively unimportant.
Finally, the Muncie Building Trades Council case9 de-
serves mention with those cases where the anti-injunction
act and the common law were operating on a mutually ex-
clusive basis. The case involved property owners who ob-
tained an injunction against a union which had "blockaded
the streets of entrance . . . overrun ... the real estate of
plaintiffs" and stopped "all automobiles . . . and all pe-
destrians" who attempted to enter the subdivision. The
union had a dispute with certain non-union contractors
who bore no relationship to the plaintiffs and who were
apparently not doing work for the plaintiffs. The court, in
affirming the injunction, stated that there was ".. . no evi-
dence that [plaintiffs] are acting for any one but them-
selves [and] no evidence whatever that they are acting for
... employers with whom the [union has] a dispute or con-
troversy."92
The result is perhaps in keeping with the Karges line
of cases and the codification of the common law by the
anti-injunction act, even if the procedural mandates and
finding requirements of that act were not necessarily fol-
lowed. The decree did not enjoin peaceful picketing; it
enjoined violence, obstruction of ingress and egress and
trespass upon plaintiffs' property. The result is not unusual
in view of the facts of the case. Violence and trespass are
enjoinable and it does not matter whether a union, a cor-
poration or an individual is involved. Conversely, absent
any restrictive legislation defining the limits of peaceful
advertising, i.e., patrolling or picketing, peaceful activity
is permissible, whether carried on by a union, an individual
91 Muncie Bldg. Trades Council v. Umbarger, 215 Ind. 13, 17 N.E.2d 828
(1938).
92 Id. at 829.
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or a corporation.
Violence and the physical trespass should have been the
decisive issue in the case. However, the court, noting that
third parties with no apparent interest in the dispute were
involved, based its decision on this point and then stated:
"the statute in question ... affords a remedy that was not
available to common law, and those seeking the benefit of
it must bring themselves clearly within its terms."
This statement is clearly erroneous. The anti-injunction
statutes did not "afford a remedy." As previously noted,
though the Norris-LaGuardia Act did create federal rights
where none had previously existed, in Indiana the statute
merely codified the common law. The court completely
ignored this point and significantly made no reference to
any of the other Indiana decisions.
VI. THE GRASS Is GREENER
The common law of Indiana and the Indiana Anti-In-
junction Act provided all the tools necessary to arrive at
equitable decisions in matters of labor relations. Some-
times the tools were used and sometimes they were not.
The latter instances perhaps were due to oversight or
the failure of the practitioner to muster the tools for the
court's use. Whatever the reason, while some confusion
resulted, little harm was done.
It is perhaps as true in judicial motivation as in other
facets of life, however, that the grass often looks greener
on the other side of the fence. Thus, when the United
States Supreme Court handed down the Swing93 and
Meadowmoor? decisions in 1941, applying "free speech"
to picketing, the Indiana Supreme Court followed the same
path. Both Swing and Meadowmoor arose in Illinois, and
93 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
04 Milkwagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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this adjacency, together with the fact that the cases were
Supreme Court pronouncements, probably accounts for
their addition to the Indiana labor law complex. To the ex-
tent that this addition reflected a willingness to follow the
mandates of the United States Supreme Court, it is un-
doubtedly commendable. Moreover, it provided another
tool in arriving at a desired result. However, the new ap-
proach began to be used to the complete exclusion of the
common law of the state and of its legislative enactments.
A. Influence of Swing and Meadowmoor - Free Speech
in Indiana
This new approach is illustrated by Davis v. Yates,9
decided within one month following the Swing and Mead-
-owmoor decisions. The union had engaged in picketing a
coal mine to procure employment at union rates. No vio-
lence was involved and the pickets varied in number from
two to twenty. Truckers coming to purchase the coal were
turned away by the persuasion of the pickets and their
,signs which read: "Unfair to Organized Labor"; "Be Fair";
"We Want Fairness." The Indiana court noted that the
Swing case involved picketing by non-employees, as did
-Meadowmoor, and that the question of the truthfulness
of the placards did not affect the decision. In discussing the
Meadowmoor case, the Indiana court stated that the Illinois
judgment enjoining the picketing was affirmed solely be-
cause of the violence involved. Consequently, the Indiana
court reversed the granting of the injunction in reliance
.on Meadowmoor and Swing, concluding that:
. . . [T]he court (U.S. Supreme) has clearly and
definitely declared that the right to picket involves the
right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion, and that in cases involving picketing state courts
must act in subordination to the jurisdiction of the Su-
95 218 Ind. 364,32 N.E.2d 86 (1941).
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preme Court of the United States to enforce constitutional
liberties. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States are controlling, and we construe the
opinions in the cases cited as clearly in point.98
Two years later, in Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union v.
Peaker,7 the Indiana Supreme Court upheld stranger
picketing to obtain a closed shop where the signs read:
"This store does not employ members of Retail Clerks
Union Local 1040, affiliated with the AFL." The court
again relied upon Swing as well as the Angelos s case
which had been decided just fifteen days earlier.
Overlooking their own backyard, both the Davis and
Peaker cases failed to treat Indiana's common law and anti-
injunction act. To be sure, in free speech matters, the
United States Supreme Court decisions are controlling but
only when the common law or statutes of a state have de-
nied federal constitutional protection. Such was not the
case in Indiana. Indiana labor law development - both de-
cisional and statutory - consistently had recognized those
rights which the Supreme Court stated must not be denied
by state action. The Illinois courts had been found to violate
federal constitutional guarantees, but from its inception,
Illinois common law99 differed substantially from that of
Indiana. Moreover, Illinois had passed an anti-injunction
statute 00 not to codify existing rights, but to create them.
Even if the court in the Peaker case did not desire to re-
96 32 N.E.2d at 87.
97 222 Ind. 209, 51 N.E.2d 628 (1943).
98 Local 302, Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
In this case the union picketed a restaurant which had no employees, all
waiters being partners. The picket signs, which contained the word "un-
fair," were held to be mere expressions of opinion and the picketing pro-
tected under the fourteenth amendment.
99 See A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 23Z
]ll. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908) (peaceful picketing enjoined because purpose
was to injure plaintiff's business in order to compel acceptance of de-
mands); Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. District Council of Chicago of United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 156 Ill. App. 327 (1910) (enjoining
conspiracy to ruin business of employer by picketing and boycott).
100 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 48, § 2 (a) (1955).
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view the entire decisional history of the state, it could
merely have looked to a case decided earlier in the same
year by the Appellate Court-Spickelmier v. Chambers.'
The facts in the Spickelmier case are significant. The
union had picketed a business engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of concrete products and other building
materials to "put your men in the Union." This was
stranger picketing; none of the company's employees
were members of the union. Several unsuccessful or-
ganizational attempts had been made and conferences
had taken place between the company and the union
wherein the union attempted to have the company pay
the union scale to the company drivers. The record reflects
no dispute between the employees and their employer.
Spickelmier is important from at least two standpoints:
In the first instance, it stated: "The act declares the pub-
lic policy of this state, defines a labor dispute and forbids
the issuance of any injuctions in a case involving or grow-
ing out of a labor dispute except in strict conformity with
the provisions thereof."' 2 It is to be noted that this declara-
tion concisely describes the purpose of 0the state anti-in-
junction act. In setting forth public policy, it actually for-
bids the use of injunctions, except when the conditions
permitting their granting have been met and the pro-
cedural requirements have been followed. This becomes
particularly significant when contrasted with the opinion
of the court in the Muncie Building Trades case, where it
was stated that the statute provided a remedy but required
the union to bring itself squarely within the terms of the
remedy.
The second element in the Spickelmier case is of even
greater import. While it holds - citing the Swing and
Meadowmoor decisions and relying on the earlier decision
101 113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N.E2d 189 (1943).
102 Id. at 190.
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of the Indiana Supreme Court in Davis v. Yates - that
".. . the right to picket involves the right of free speech
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and ... in cases
involving picketing state courts must act in subordination
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States to enforce constitutional liberties,"' 3 the court then
proceeds to analyze its own anti-injunction statute and
finds that a labor dispute exists as defined in the act, "...
irrespective of any question of constitutional guaran-
tees.""o4
The Spickelmier case also involved another problem
which has been considered in conjunction with "free
speech" and anti-injunction guarantees, this being the
truth or falsity of the statements on the placards carried by
pick-ts. In interpreting the Indiana anti-injunction act,
the ( 5urt held that the basic purpose of the picketing was
to ol tain the union scale; therefore, the carrying of
placards bearing the legend "This place is unfair to or-
ganizEd labor," did not constitute picketing accompanied
by false statements or misrepresentation of the facts. In
describing the terzm "unfair to organized labor," the court
said that this term has a well understood meaning, and
that:
It neither says nor implies that the one picketed is
unfair to all organized labor. It advertises, and in our
opinion is now generally understood to advertise the
existence of a controversy between the one being
picketed and organized labor in some one or more of its
several branches, but not necessarily all organized
labor.10
This same issue, from the standpoint of whether or not
loose picket sign language constitutes "fraud," was also
treated in Davis v. Yates. While there the court relied en-
103 Id. at 190, a citation from the Davis case, 32 N.E.2d at 87.
104 47 N.E.2d at 190.
105 Id. at 191-92.
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tirely upon the "free speech" decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, it nevertheless discussed the signs
used by the pickets, the language of which was almost
identical to that used in the Spickelmier case. In answer
to the plaintiff's contention that the signs were not true,
the court in Davis stated:
[.. T]his contention ignores the actualities. There
was a labor dispute between the [defendants] and the
owner of the mine ... and it seems that the union con-
siders the operation of the mine by workunen eligible
to become members of the union [they were not mem-
bers] ... to be in itself unfair and inimical to the best
interests of union labor30 6
While the Davis case is perhaps more realistic than
Spickelmier in its treatment of picket sign language, from
an overall standpoint the court in Spickelmier is par-
ticularly articulate because its decision treats and signifi-
cantly recognizes its own state law and finds that as re-
gards the state of Indiana there is nothing requiring the in-
tervention of federal doctrines, since the law of Indiana
is not contrary to the protections contained in the federal
Constitution.
The Spickelmier case, however, seems to be plagued by
two previous developments, Wiest v. Dirks,"°7 decided by
the Indiana Supreme Court in 1939, and the Roth trilogy..8
which extended from 1939 to 1942. In the Wiest case a
grocery store owner who had purchased milk from an
allegedly unfair dairy was being picketed by the union
with signs which read: "Please buy Union Dairy Products
06 32 N.E.2d at 88. To complete the discussion of the Spickelmier case,
note should be taken of the employer's contention that if a labor dispute
existed, it had ceased or been abandoned by the passage of time. The court
rejected this theory on a factual basis.
107 215 Ind. 568, 20 N.E2d 969 (1939).
1os Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 NE2d 280
(1939); Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union v. Roth, 218 Ind. 275, 31 N.E2d 986
(1941); Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union v. Roth, 219 Ind. 642, 39 N.E2d 775(1942).
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Only. This store sells milk produced in an unfair Dairy.
East End Dairy is unfair to organized labor." The court
found that the signs contained false statements and a mis-
representation of the facts. It stated that the signs neces-
sarily led to the inference that the products of the dairy
were non-union and that there were union goods available.
The court stated that all dairy products available in the
community were produced at plants which employed both
non-union and union employees, or "at least none was
produced in shops employing union labor exculsively."
Thus, the court stated that the language on the signs con-
stituted an attempt to persuade the public that union
products could be purchased at stores which were not
being picketed, and this, the court felt, was misrepresenta-
tion. It concluded by stating:
[.. T]he evidence justifies the conslusion that the
facts advertised by the banners of the pickets were
calculated to produce a false impression upon the public.
Regardless of the intention of the pickets, the statements
have the effect of misrepresenting the facts in contro-
versy. Since this is true, it supports the conclusion that
the picketing as conducted was unlawful and the tem-
porary injunction justified.109
B. The Roth Trilogy
Wiest was followed approximately seven months later
by the first Roth case. Although contradicted in later deci-
sions, the initial determination of the Roth facts found that
the plaintiff, a retail grocery store operator, was picketed
to induce his three employees to reinstate their union
membership. The employees had joined the union when
threatened with loss of their jobs, but upon being ordered
to strike at the risk of incurring fines if they refused, the
employees refused to strike and resigned from the union.
109 20 N.E.2d at 972.
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Picketing was commenced with signs, which stated that
the employer was unfair to organized labor.
The Indiana Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff
had performed all of the obligations imposed upon him by
law; that he was at peace with his employees; that none
belonged or wanted to belong to the picketing union; and,
finally, that the object of the picketing was to have the
grocer sign a closed shop agreement which would compel
his employees to join the union against their will."' ° In its
decision, the court made a slight reference to Karges,
Thomas, and Kokomo, but it failed to treat any of the facts
in these cases which were decided both prior and subse-
quent to the passage of the anti-injunction act. It con-
cluded that the purpose of the picketing was unlawful,
irrespective of the signs used, and quoted from the pre-
amble of the anti-injunction act.
If the court was attempting to ascertain the purpose of
the anti-injunction act, it would appear that it could and
should have looked to what was said in Kokomo'1 - the
first case in the state dealing with this statute. Instead it
went outside the state of authority, looking first to a
decision of the District Court of Appeals of California,
McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local 1067,
which, in the opinion of the Indiana. court, had reached
the "same conclusion" under a statute "substantially like"
the Indiana act. But was the California statute substan-
110 The trial court decision is interesting. It found that a labor dispute
existed within the terms of the anti-injunction act. Evidently, the trial
court was disturbed only by the signs, for it authorized further picketing
but merely decreed that the signs conform to certain size restrictions and
specified that they bear the following legend: "The Object of this picketing
is to compel the store owner to sign a closed shop contract with Retail
Clerks Union Local No. 1460, A.F. of L. ... " 24 N.E.2d at 281.
The Indiana Supreme Court went well beyond the trial court's finding,
holding that the picketing was unlawful, irrespective of the picket sign
language. It also criticized the trial court's attempt to specify the picket
sign language, relying at least in part on the free speech doctrine.
1 See text at 592.
112 89 P.2d 426 (Cal. App. 1939).
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tially like that of Indiana and did the McKay case reach
the same conclusion? The court in Roth was wrong on both
counts.
The California statute differed substantially from the
Indiana anti-injunction act. It dealt exclusively with "yel-
low dog" contracts, prohibiting such agreements," 3 and
was not an anti-injunction statute in any respect. Thus, in
the McKay case, the California District Court of Appeals
attempted to utilize a statute for a purpose other than that
for which it was intended. The Roth case compounded
the error by applying the resultant decision to a case
arising under an entirely different, yet equally inap-
propriate, statute. Subsequently, however, the Supreme
Court of California rectified the initial error upon review
of the District Court of Appeals decision" 4 as well as in
a companion case, Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists, decid-
ed on the same day as McKay.
Nor did the McKay case result in the same holding as
Roth, for, as stated above, the District Court of Appeals
was promptly reversed by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, and certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
was denied."' The facts in McKay were quite similar to
those in Roth because in the California case stranger
picketing was being conducted for the purpose of com-
pelling a closed shop agreement. The trial court held that
peaceful picketing utilized to unionize a plant must be
found unlawful for some other reason than the mere fact
that it is picketing. The court felt that the factual situation
must have been such that it violated legal rights of the
picketed employer or his employees. The District Court
of Appeals of California reversed the trial court, stating
113 CAL. LAB. CODE AwrN. §§ 920-923 (West 1955).
114 McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311,
106 P.2d 373 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941).
-15 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P.2d 403 (1940).
116 McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106
P.2d 373 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941).
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that section 923 of the California statute made such picket-
ing illegal. 7 But, as indicated, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia then reversed and upheld the trial court's reasoning
that the statute did not prohibit stranger picketing to ob-
tain a closed shop, stating:
The interest of the defendant unions in the present
controversy is direct and obvious. The closed union
shop is an important means of maintaining the combined
bargaining power of the workers. Moreover, advantages
secured through collective action redound to the benefit
of all employees whether they are members of the union
or not, and members may resent non-members sharing in
the benefits without liability for the obligations. Hence
a closed shop policy is of vital importance in maintaining
not only the bargaining power but also the membership
of trade unions ...
Of course, the employer and its salesmen argue that...
[unions] have no right to interfere with relations which
are entirely satisfactory to them. This position ignores the
broader rights of labor in seeking to advance the interests
of the worker by more thorough and complete organiza-
tion." s
Finally, the court made a significant comment in relation
to the power of the judiciary in the event it believes certain
corrections are necessary in labor-management affairs.
It stated:
The public ultimately pays the full cost of every labor
dispute and better labor relations must be established.
But if they cannot be brought about by enlightened
self-interest the remedy lies with the legislature - not
in the courts - in so far as contests peaceably conducted
for a purpose legitimately connected with the welfare
of labor as a whole is concerned." 9
Thus,. although the Roth decision relied upon the Cali-
"7 McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesman's Local 1067, 89 P2d 426 (Cal.
App. 1939).
318 McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesman's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311,
106 P.2d 373, 381-84 (1940).
19 Id. at 384.
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fornia case, the ultimate California decision is directly
contrary to the Roth holding; moreover, the statute in the
California case not only fails to prohibit the type of activity
complained of in Roth, but actually is nothing more than
a limitation upon employers as regards "yellow dog"
contracts.
The first Roth case also made reference to a 1939 Wash-
ington decision, Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Local 297.-
Here again, one salient fact was overlooked. The state of
Washington in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co.,
121
held sections seven, eight, and nine of its anti-injunction
act unconstitutional. These sections had limited a court's
power in granting injunctions to those specific acts alleged
in the complaint which were proved to be unlawful. Thus,
a goodly portion of the effectiveness of the Washington
act had been removed three years before the first Roth
decision.
Perhaps the Indiana court in the Roth case cannot
be blamed for failing to analyze the California and Wash-
ington law; nor can it be charged with undue reliance upon
the Illinois decisions in Swing and Meadowmoor which
were subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. However, this much can be said: the Roth case
should have looked first to those Indiana decisions which
had interpreted the common law and had made it con-
vincingly clear that the anti-injunction act merely codified
the common law. Moreover, as previously indicated, there
were decisions subsequent to the act, outside of Indiana,
which illustrated the underlying purpose of anti-injunction
statutes. If the court in the Roth case intended to look
beyond its own territorial limits, why did it not look to
the Supreme Court in Senn v. Tile Layers Union,22 which
120 200 Wash. 283, 93 P2d 422 (1939).
121 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936).
122 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
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held the Wisconsin anti-injunction statute constitutional
as applied to stranger picketing aimed not only at requir-
ing the employer to hire union employees but to cease
doing work himself as well.
Prior to the second Roth case," 3 the Supreme Court
had handed down its decision in Thornhill v. Alabama"
and Carlson v. California,''5 the former holding uncon-
stitutional a state statute prohibiting picketing, the latter a
city ordinance with a like prohibition. Even more signifi-
cant, the Illinois Swing and Meadowmoor cases, upon
which the court relied in Roth number one, were reversed
by the United States Supreme Court fourteen days prior
to the decision in Roth number two. Yet, the Indiana court
made no reference to these reversals. Similarly, it re-
mained silent on this point in Roth number three. Ironi-
cally, Roth number one did treat free speech when it
criticized the trial court for attempting to dictate the size
of the lettering and the language on the picket signs. It
stated that if picketing had been proper in the first place,
it was not the function of the court to prescribe the form,
context, and character of the sign. The privilege of free
speech was said to carry with it freedom of choice as to the
mode of expression that may be employed.
Having a golden opportunity to become one of the
first enunciators of the free speech doctrine, the court
unfortunately either fumbled or passed. In Roth number
two, and if not there, most certainly in Roth number three,
the court' could have relied on Swing and' Meadowmoor
and at least parenthetically noted that it had discussed free
speech prior to the issuance of these Supreme Court
decisions. For some reason it did not elect to do so.
Briefly to complete the Roth cycle, the second Roth
223 218 Ind. 275, 31 N.E.2d 986 (1941).
324 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
125 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
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decision came up on review of the final judgment enjoin-
ing the picketing. The first case was based upon an appeal
from the temporary injunction. The court in the second
case stated that it did not have the evidence, as such, before
it on the first appeal but had relied on the trial court's
findings. Having all of the evidence on the second appeal
the court found that at the outset of the picketing and for
several hours thereafter, all plaintiffs' employees belonged
to the union, and that they resigned only after they had
signed a letter prepared by Roth. Thus, the court held that
the picketing was legal because when the picketing began,
the purpose was ". . . to coerce an employer, all of whose
employees were members of the picketing union, to agree
that in the future he would employ only union mem-
bers."'26 The court then went on to say that Roth had been
unfair because he had interfered and therefore that the
picketing signs and banners spoke the truth. Accordingly,
the injunction was dissolved and a new trial was granted.
This resulted in the third Roth case. The new trial was
held and the trial court again granted an injunction from
which an appeal was taken. On appeal, the court made
reference to the earlier Roth cases and then stated that the
basis for the second decision was the fact that the em-
ployer interfered, aided, and encouraged his employees to
leave the union. This time the contention of the plaintiff
was that the employees had ceased being members of the
union several hours before the employer interfered because
the union agent had told the employees that it would
cost them $50.00 to be reinstated in the union. The
employees testified they had understood that they were
no longer members and therefore regarded the letter of
resignation as merely formal notification of a prior sever-
ance of their relation with the union. The court reasoned
that the letter assumed the present existence of a relation-
126 31 N.E2d at 989.
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ship which it purported to dissolve. The court also noted
that the employee witness who had testified in the second
case relative to the facts surrounding the signing of the
letter had, now changed her testimony. In conclusion, the
court said:
While there may be some doubt from the evidence that
she or the other clerks were in fact coerced, there is no
escape from the conclusion that their employer interfered
and aided and encouraged his employees to sever a con-
nection with the union which he thought existed, and this
at the time of the picketing which he sought to enjoin. We
think the facts are substantially the same as related in the
second opinion which therefore is the law of the case.'2 7
Thus the Roth trilogy came to an end, except to plague
and confuse practitioners as well as the courts. Obviously,
the court was required to reverse its position in the first
case - not by reason of the tenuous distinction drawn
relative to the facts, but because the decision did not
represent the law of Indiana, let alone that of California
and Washington upon which reliance had been mistakenly
placed. It must have been apparent to the court by the
time Roth number three arrived that the employees were
not desirous of joining the union, and irrespective of
whether or not the employer interfered, the fact of the
matter was that if the picketing continued, it was stranger
picketing for the purpose of compelling the employees to
join the union... and this was neither outlawed by the
common law nor the anti-injunction act.
It is to be noted that while in the first Roth case the trial
court found that a labor dispute existed and attempted to
enjoin those acts which it considered to be unlawful,
namely the language on the picket sign, the Supreme Court
did not pass upon whether a labor dispute existed as such,
but merely declared the purpose to be unlawful. While
absence of interference of an employer is a prerequisite to
127 39 N.E2d at 776.
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obtaining relief under the anti-injunction act, the court
did not point this out. Moreover, although the language of
the picket sign was deemed unimportant in Roth number
one, the court in Roth two became involved in the language
used because it stated that the employer had been unfair
and that the banner carried by the picket therefore spoke
the truth.
It is obvious that the reversal of the Roth case was not
based upon a re-examination of the facts. It can only be
the result of the court's analysis of the earlier decisions,
the policy of the statute, and the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had spoken at least four times in the
interim between the first and second Roth cases. It is
indeed unfortunate that the Indiana court did not have
these authorities before it when it decided the first Roth
case and perhaps equally unfortunate that it did not
attempt to clarify the situation by the time the second and
third Roth cases had been decided.
The Roth trilogy represents the greatest blot on the
judicial development of Indiana's labor law. It is a study
of paradox and confusion. It is perhaps a truism that
progress moves not in a straight line but through peaks
and valleys. Each state has a Roth case, but none has a
trilogy of Roths. Thus, except for the fact that they con-
stitute a valley in what might almost be a straight line of
progress, the Roth cases should not be too disturbing.
While they have never been overruled, they are irrecon-
cilable with and not representative of subsequent de-
cisions. 2 '
1-28 It should be noted in this regard that the Davis and Peaker cases,
see text at 599-604, demonstrate that stranger picketing conducted for
the purpose of obtaining a closed shop, irrespective of whether or not
any of the employees involved are members of the union, is perfectly legal,
not only by reason of the free speech cases, but under Indiana common
law and anti-injunction act.
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VII. A CONTEMPORARY LOOK
The Indiana cases following Davis v. Yates and Local
1460, Retail Clerks Union v. Peaker 29 were all decided
by the appellate court. While the subsequent decisions
overlook many of the previous cases, and while, perhaps
due to inarticulation, some incorrect results have occurred,
the common law and legislative policy as set out in the
previous sections are generally followed. 30
A 1955 decision 3. dissolved a temporary injunction
prohibiting peaceful picketing not only because the decree
did not specify the specific acts under restraint, but also
because the allegations on their face did not make out a
case for relief, the court stating that:
Such an injunction, even if only temporary, is contrary to
law as it has long -since become the settled law of this
state that picketing, in connection with a labor dispute,
without resort to threats, force, intimidation, fraud or
other unlawful means is a proper exercise of the right of
129 See text at 599-604.
130 See, e.g., Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E.2d 377 (1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 840 (1947) (criminal action for violence arising from labor dis-
pute); Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind. 314, 111 N.E.2d 812 (1953) (civil action for
assault also in context of labor dispute); Faultless Castor Corp. v. United
Elec. Workers, Local 813, 119 Ind. App. 330, 86 N.E.2d 703 (1949) (injunction
to prohibit employer's breach of collective bargaining agreement denied
because of applicability of anti-injunction act and existence of adequate
remedy at law); Janalene, Inc. v. Burnett, 220 Ind. 253, 41 N.E.2d 942 (1942)
(employer enjoined from farming out work in violation of collective bar-
gaining agreement, but specific enforcement of arbitration clause to deter-
mine damages denied). As to enforceability of arbitration agreements, see
Mamet, Are Federal Labor Laws Conflicting or Complementary?, 7 LA. L. J.
749 (1956).
As an indication of recent diverse approaches, compare Local 103, Bar-
tenders, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union v. Clark Restaurants, Inc.,
112 Ind. App. 165, 102 N.E.2d 220 (1951) (stranger picketing enjoined for
absence of labor dispute) with Koss v. Continental Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224, 52
N.E.2d 614 (1944) (stranger picketing to compel owner-operator of gasoline
station to comply with union conditions held lawful in the absence of fraud
or violence).
131 Teamsters v. Stewart's Bakery of Rochester, 125 Ind. App. 174, 123
N.E.2d 468 (1955).
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free speech and peaceable assemblage.' 32
Fulford v. Smith Cabinet133 presented the issue of
whether the employer, in accordance with the provisions
of the anti-injunction act, was prohibited from obtaining
an injunction against the specific acts of mass picketing
and violence because he had failed to make "every reason-
able effort to settle [the] dispute." the most interesting
feature of the case is neither the issue nor the holding.'34
The dissenting opinion, wholly apart from the issue in
the case or the conclusion reached, 35 presents the fullest
existing Indiana decisional commentary on the policy
underlying and the motivation for the passage of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, which, as Justice Bowen stated, is "in
all respects identical" with the Indiana act.
With a few exceptions, to be considered briefly, this
concludes the analysis of all of the Indiana decisions, as
of the date of this writing, dealing with the right of workers
to strike, picket and engage in other activity in their self-
interest designed to elevate their status, gain new members
132 Id. at 469.
IM 118 Ind. App. 326, 77 N.E2d 755 (1948).
134 The factual basis of the Fulford case should be examined. The Union
won a consent election but the employer refused to recognize the union
until it was certified. The union, however, refused to file the affidavits and
reports required by sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act and
hence was not certified. The union then engaged in mass picketing, tres-
pass, forceful entry and other violent activity to force recognition. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the trial court's decision enjoining unlawful acts in
connection with the picketing activities. The court examined the filing re-
quirements of the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that if a union had not
complied with same, it could not compel recognition. On this reasoning, the
court concluded that the employer had not failed "to comply with an obliga-
tion imposed by law" under the terms of the anti-injunction act. While
this conclusion is interesting, the United States Supreme Court has found
it to be wrong. Failure to comply with the filing requirements only de-
prives the union of the right to use the machinery of the National Labor
Relations Board. It does not relieve the union of its rights to be recognized
or to any other rights or liabilities. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak
Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
135 In the opinion of the writer the dissenting Justice was correct not
only by reason of the Arkansas Oak Flooring case, supra note 134, but in the
application of the state anti-injunction act.
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and protect the wages and conditions which they have
secured. The latest pronouncements, Murrin v. Cook Bros.
Dairy,, 6 decided November 9, 1956, and Blackburn v.
Koehler,'37 decided March 12, 1957, are not helpful in
interpreting common law or statutory law, nor are they
useful for illustrative purposes.
On the other hand, the Merchandise Warehouse Com-
pany case, 3' decided on March 13, 1956, serves to high-
light the basic problems and misunderstandings common to
most states. There, the question framed by the court was
whether a labor dispute existed under the anti-injunction
act. A teamster's local had originally organized the em-
ployer's employees; those who became members of the
136 138 N.E2d 907 (Ind. App. 1956). Murrin involved an action for an
injunction against picketing of an employer's premises in order to obtain
a union shop agreement. The defendants admitted the purpose of the
picketing was unlawful, the appellate court stating, 138 N.E.2d at 911: "Thus
it is apparent that the purpose of the conduct of appellants as found by the
Court is contrary to the express public policy of this state and unlawful,
-and was conduct which should have been enjoined, if other conditions pre-
cedent to the issuance of an injunction existed. Appellants do not contend
.otherwise... ." (Emphasis added.) While there does not appear to be any
basis for such admission, the sole issue then became whether the employer
had made "every reasonable effort to settle such dispute" as required by
section eight of the anti-injunction act. The court, Justice Bowen dissenting,
affirmed the trial court which had granted a temporary injunction, con-
cluding at 912 that, "The law did not require appellee to further nego-
tiate, mediate or arbitrate as to whether or not it would be required to
commit an unlawful act." Cf. Fulford v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co, 118 Ind.
App. 326, 77 N.E.2d 755 (1948).
In as much as the Murrin decision is limited to this narrow statutory
point, it is not particularly significant. However, had the defendants not
admitted that the picketing was unlawful, the case necessarily would- have
'been decided differently. As early as 1895 in the Clemitt case and as re-
cently as the last supreme court pronouncement in the Peaker case, Indiana
courts consistently have upheld picketing, stranger or otherwise, to obtain
mot only union shop, but closed shop conditions. It is interesting that the
appellate court mentioned neither of these cases, nor did it cite the recent
Merchandise Warehouse case (see note 138 infra), decided by the same
court and virtually the same judges as decided Murrin.
137 140 NE2d 763 (Ind. App. 1957). Blackburn reversed the trial court's
temporary injunction in a labor dispute because of the court's failure to
make specific findings, and because the trial court exceeded its power in
directing that a representation election be held.
138 Local 135, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Merchandise Warehouse
'Corp., 132 N2E2d 715 (Ind. App. 1956).
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union quit the employ of the company to work elsewhere.
New employees were hired and no further attempt was
made at organization. Some time later, however, a picket
line was established with placards noting that the com-
pany failed to employ "members" of the union. At the
outset, the court announced that: ". . . a union's attempt to
organize a group of employees and the unwillingness of
such employees of such employers to be organized consti-
tutes a labor dispute."' 3 9
This statement is obviously an enlightened one because
it reflects a realization that disputes between "employees"
and those attempting to organize, i.e., strangers, are pro-
tected under the anti-injunction act. The court proceeded,
however, to find that the picketing was unlawful because
there was no resistance to the union's organizing activity,
and that the only effort was completely successful without
the aid of a picket line. The court stated that ". . . for
some reason not disclosed by the evidence they [the union]
slept on their rights until those employees whom they had
'signed up' left the appellee's employ and went elsewhere
to work."' 40 It then noted that no effort was made to
negotiate with the company or its existing employees but
picketing was started approximately one year following
the successful organizing campaign.
It is apparent that the only justification for the holding
of the majority is that it believed that the union was not
acting in its own self-interest. In other words, if the union
was not interested in organizing the existing employees
and if it had no desire to negotiate for those who were 100
percent organized before they quit, what then was the basis
of the dispute? To be sure, a demand could have been
made for a closed shop to have the company hire and use
only existing union members. This would have been legal;
the court noted, however, that "... to this day the matter
139 Id. at 717.
140 Ibid.
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of hiring members of said local has never been discussed.
: . .14 The answer as to the union's interest, as the court
indicated, was "not disclosed by the evidence."
If the holding of the majority 142 can be interpreted in
this vein alone, i.e., that the union was not picketing in its
own self-interest, then while the reasoning of the majority
may not conform to the common law and a proper in-
terpretation of the anti-injunction act, the result may not
be too far astray. However, other considerations - pro-
cedural, substantive and evidentiary - were involved in
the case and these considerations necessarily direct a
conclusion opposite from that reached by the majority.
Initially, it must be noted that even assuming that the
union was not acting in its own self-interest, this issue does
not depend upon whether a "labor dispute" existed, but
the query is whether the case falls within the exceptions
to the anti-injunction act, i.e., "fraud" or "violence." It is
to be emphasized that the anti-injunction act does not state
that matters involving fraud or violence take the case out-
side the definition of a "labor dispute." It merely recites
that the prohibition against issuing injunctions in labor
disputes shall be inapplicable if fraud or violence is in-
volved. The Merchandise Warehouse case, then, revolved
not around the definition of a labor dispute, because a labor
dispute was unquestionably involved. The issue properly
was whether the union's failure to act in its self-interest -
if such was the case - permits the granting of an in-
junction. This requires an analysis of the exceptions.
A. Exceptions: Fraud and Violence
As regards the two exceptions - fraud and violence -
the latter appears clear in itself, and if violence has oc-
curred, then the specific wrongful act will be enjoined but
'4:L Id. at 718.
142 Chief Judge Royse wrote a concurring opinion in which he suggested
a restrictive interpretation of the anti-injunction act.
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peaceful picketing may continue. But what is meant by
"fraud"? Those Indiana courts interpreting the word have
made it synonymous with "misrepresentation" and have
used it in connection with the language on the picket signs.
It has been shown 43 that words such as "unfair" and re-
lated general expressions of opinion rightfully are not
categorized as misrepresentation or "fraud." What words
then would constitute sufficient misrepresentation to fall
into this category? As noted in Davis v. Yates,' the court
utilized a subjective test where it said the "union con-
siders" the activities of the employer to be unfair to the
best interest of union labor. This attitude has prevailed
in most decisions 4 5 except where a court apparently de-
sired to enjoin picketing and then rationalized the decision
in terms of "misrepresentation" because of the language
on the picket signs. 46 The court in the Merchandise Ware-
house case, having decided to affirm the issuance of an
injunction, felt constrained to bolster its position by stating
that the language on the signs constituted "misrepresenta-
tion."
Based, however, upon the definition in the Davis case,
at what point does the subjective test of what the union
believes disappear as an expression of its opinion, and
when does "fraud" take its place? Can picket sign language
amount to fraud? It is submitted that this issue is indeed
minor. If the sign goes too far then, under the act, the
specific wrongful conduct, i.e., the misrepresentation con-
143 On the question of picket sign language see: Local No. 1460, Retail
Clerks Union v. Peaker, 222 Ind. 209, 51 N.E.2d 628 (1943); Scofes v. Hel-
mar, 205 Ind. 596, 187 N.E. 662 (1933); Spickelmier v. Chambers, 113 Ind.
App. 470, 47 N.E.2d 189 (1943); Davis v. Yates, 218 Ind. 364, 32 N.E.2d 86
(1941); Vonderschmitt v. McGuire, 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N.E. 585 (1935).
144 218 Ind. 364, 32 N.E.2d 86 (1941).
145 See note 143 supra.
146 Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280
(1940) (Roth number one); Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568, 20 N.E.2d 969 (1939).
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tained on the picket signs' 7 can be enjoined, but the in-
junction's scope cannot exceed this limited prohibition.
These verbal gymnastics relative to picket signs serve
no purpose.' They either beg the question or are used as
a device to enjoin, in order to circumvent the clear man-
dates of the act. What if a sign merely stated the name of
the union or contained an innocuous statement such as
"The XYZ Company is Being Picketed"? This would be
merely a statement of an existing circumstance as reflected
by the actual presence of the picket and certainly would
not constitute misrepresentation. One wonders what would
have been the result if such a picket sign had been used
in those few cases involving questions of misrepresenta-
tion. Speculation aside, however, it appears patent that the
real question as regards "fraud" should have little con-
cern with picket sign language.
What then is "fraud"? It is the failure to act in one's
self-interest. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
term "self-interest" is a broad one, for it includes not only
organizing and attempting to enforce collective bargaining
demands, but it is equally applicable to picketing to enforce
union conditions, including a demand for the use of union
labor and meeting union rates.
It will be remembered that in the tavern keeper ex-
ample 49 in the Karges case, the person objecting to taverns
thought that his neighborhood would be improved if there
were no taverns. Thus, even though he might succeed in
closing the tavern keeper's business, this action would be
permitted and the injury would be damnum absque in-
juria. But what if once monthly he traveled to a strange
147 While the trial court in Roth number one may have erred in seeking
to define the size and the language of the signs, it was correct in so far as it
was aware that it could not enjoin all picketing merely because a sign was
deemed inaccurate.
148 In actual practice the language of the sign means little, if anything. It
is the presence of the picket which lends effectiveness to picketing.
149 See text at 571-72.
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city and for no personal reason, but out of sheer malice,
attempted to force a tavern keeper there out of business?
Would he not then be acting outside of the scope of his
legitimate self-interest? If in the Merchandise Warehouse
case the union was not picketing to attempt to have union
conditions prevail, either by the employment of its own
members or by unionizing the company's employees,
then it may not have been acting in its own self-interest,
and no purpose beneficial to the union and its members
could have been served by the picketing. If this is under-
lying the majority holding, the result is perhaps explain-
able. However, it is to be emphasized that in view of the
encompassing nature of the term "self-interest," a court
must define the scope of this term with non-confining eyes.
In Merchandise Warehouse, the two dissenting judges
believed that the union was interested in organizing. To
this extent, however slim the majority may have believed
the evidence to be, the picketing should not have been en-
joined. It is not for a court to pass upon the organizational
zeal or efficiency of a union. Any evidence indicating self-
interest should be sufficient, and certainly the burden of
proof should not be upon the union when a "labor dispute"
exists, but rather upon the complainant who alleges the
"fraud."
Finally, the majority in Merchandise Warehouse appears
to have avoided the issue of the scope of the injunction.
The dissent pointed out that there were "no specific un-
lawful acts enjoined."' 50 It would appear, however, that
even under the majority reasoning the union could picket
again if it first made attempts to negotiate with the com-
pany, or attempted to organize its employees or made a
demand that the company hire union members. The
majority apparently believed that a settlement could have
been reached without picketing. This criterion, however,
150 132 N.E.2d at 724.
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as a bare determinant in justifying or condemning picket-
ing is found in neither the common law nor the anti-
injunction act. But, here again, the court undoubtedly was
motivated by its belief that the union was not acting to
protect its own self-interest - that it had no desire to
reach a settlement because its probable aim was to put the
company out of business.
The foregoing constitutes the only rationale of the
Merchandise Warehouse case compatible with Indiana
law. But this compatibility falls short of perfection because
wholly apart from any other consideration, the anti-in-
junction act clearly directs that the scope of the injunction
be limited to enjoining the specific unlawful acts, which in
this case could only have involved picketing not in the
union's self-interest.'51
VIII. THE RIGHT To WORK LAW
Will the Indiana Right to Work Act affect the prior
Indiana decisions?. 52 Perhaps not - and this may be so
irrespective of the fact that many of the cases involved
151 Merchandise Warehouse also treated the question of federal pre-
emption. The court made its own findings that the jurisdictional yardsticks
of the NLRB proved that the company was not engaged in interstate com-
merce and therefore the state court could act. Compare the recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, notes 4-6 supra. Irrespective of compliance
with federal preemption, the rationale of Merchandise Warehouse comes
dangerously close to violating "free speech" concepts. It will be recalled
that the court found that the picket sign language constituted misrepre-
sentation. The United States Supreme Court treated this exact point in
Cafeteria Employees v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943), where in a situa-
tion involving stranger picketing, it reversed the state court injunction,
stating that: ".... to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part
of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political contro-
versies ... is not to falsify facts." 320 U.S. at 295.
152 Indiana Senate Bill No. 306, which would have required a vote by secret
ballot by a majority of the employees before a strike could occur if the
employer requested same, was defeated in the legislature. Had this passed,
there would have been a serious question as to the state's authority. See
United Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
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a closed shop demand. 5 ' This query, of course, permits no
hindsight evaluation in Indiana and any inquiry into the
future would be pure speculation. 5 This much must be
emphasized, however. The sole grant to the states to pass
right to work acts is contained in section 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.'55 This permits only the prohibiting of
agreements conditioning continued employment upon com-
pulsory membership in a union. 6 The recent Supreme
Court pronouncements relative to preemption 57 may well
raise interesting questions as to (1) whether the states'
153 The only United States Supreme Court case containing a full decision
dealing with the status of picketing under right to work laws is Local 10,
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953). There it was held that Vir-
ginia state courts could enjoin picketing where the purpose of the picketing
was to force the employer to eliminate all non-union employees and hence
was in violation of the policy of the Virginia Right to Work Act. The Supreme
Court took note of another Virginia case, Painters & Paperhangers Local 1018
v. Rountree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402 (1952), where the Virginia act
was construed not to prohibit peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose.
Thus, the Supreme Court in effect held that the Virginia courts were at-
tempting to apply the Virginia act reasonably and in accordance with con-
stitutional principles. It should be noted, of course, that the Graham case
was decided prior to the Garner case and the formulation of the federal
preemption doctrine. Accordingly, the Graham case is of limited authority
to the extent that the activity complained of would be held to be protected
or prohibited activity under the Taft-Hartley Act. In this connection see
Local 429, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers
Co., 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3351 (U.S. May 27, 1957), where the Supreme Court, in
a per curiam order, reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
which had sustained the enjoining of picketing designed to secure a union
security arrangement in violation of the state right to work law. For a fuller
treatment of this question, see Mamet, Federal Preemption, Free Speech and
Right to Work Statutes, 51 Nw. U. L. RE v.(1957).
'54 On June 20, 1957, the Appellate Court of Indiana, in Smith v. General
Motors Corp., 32 CCH LAB. CAS. f[ 70,787 upheld the denial of an injunction
which had been sought to restrain the application of a union shop contract.
The court held that the state Anti-Injunction Act did not prohibit union shop
contracts.
155 See note 11 supra.
156 See the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557-59 (1949). In addition to noting that the
right to "prohibit" union shop contracts is quite a different matter than
forcing "union members to work with nonunion workers," Justice Rutledge
suggested that if a case involving a strike arose under these acts, serious
thirteenth amendment questions would be presented. It should be noted
that Justice Rutledge retired prior to the Graham case, supra note 149, which
presented these issues in part.
157 See notes 4-6 supra.
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exercise of this limited grant under section 14(b) must
strictly conform to the language of the statute, i.e., pro-
hibiting agreements dealing with employment and com-
pulsory union membership; (2) whether union activity
not involving the execution of such prohibited agreements
would be either prohibited or protected by federal law
and thus outside the scope of state regulation. Similarly,
will the state anti-injunction act have any bearing upon
attempts to enjoin picketing involving right to work issues?
What if stranger picketing occurs, not in support of a
closed shop demand, but to advertise the employer's
failure to pay prevailing wages?.5 An injunction in this
area might present serious free speech issues even though
the ultimate effect of the picketing may accomplish the
same result, i.e., unionization of the employees, irrespective
of the announced purpose. Other such inquiries could be
raised but they would be beyond the scope and space
limitations of this article. Suffice it to say that this type of
legislation, designed in its barest sense, first by statute
and then judicial decision, to weaken unionism and the
financial benefits derived therefrom by its members may
not necessarily satisfy its designers. Federal preemption,
free speech, and state statutes and decisions will play an
important role in future interpretations and applications
of the right to work acts.
IX. CONCLUSION
Some fifty odd years have elapsed since Karges. Nation-
ally, and in most states, a major sociological metamorpho-
sis has occurred. In the main, the old conspiracy cry has
158 See, e.g., the recent Tennessee case, Flatt v. Barbers' Union, 31 CCH
LAE. CAS. 11 70,486 (Tenn. Feb. 8, 1957), rev'd on rehearing, 32 CCH LAB. CAS.
ff 70,698 (Tenn. May 3, 1957). Cf. Pruitt v. Lambert,.. Tenn...., 298
S.W.2d 795 (1957).
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disappeared and the "ends" of labor organizations have
grown to be accepted as legitimate. But for a natural time
lag, labor's emancipation and recognition have by and
large conformed to the industrial development and growth
of the country. In Indiana, however, neither the courts nor
the legislature found industrial development and growth
to be a prerequisite to recognition of individual and group
rights. From the beginning, and with concentrated con-
tinuity, Indiana recognized the right of an individual to
belong to a labor organization and the right of such
organization to engage in activities designed to enhance
and protect its legitimate objectives and accomplishments.
The Indiana anti-injunction act was not passed to correct
governmental injunction abuses, but rather merely to
codify existing law. While early Indiana legislation and
decisional law appear to ignore each other, the results and
purposes are compatible. Each case and each statute de-
cries exploitation and echoes Karges: "Whatever one man
may do, all men may do, and what all may do singly they
may do in concert."' 59
To be sure, some confusion has existed and still pre-
vails. This is due principally to the fact that state courts
have felt constrained to look to other states, while neglect-
ing to consider the differences between their law and the
law in such other states. Occasional decisions seem to con-
flict with the purpose and policy underlying state statu-
tory enactments. As has been seen in Indiana, the reason
lies solely in reliance on decisions outside the confines of
the state. This is the nub of the problem. This is perhaps
also one reason for the passage of a right to work act, i.e.,
the legislature may have been unduly influenced by the
passage of similar statutes in other states. As to the effects
of such a statute, one must wait and see. Retrospectively,
justification or necessity for such a statute is not dis-
359 175 N.E. at 880.
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cernible. It holds no apparent benefits for legitimate in-
dustry or for employees.
In the final analysis, the question of permitted and
prohibited activity revolves around the duty of one partici-
pant to the other. This duty cannot be determined by
applying "property" concepts; it can only be found in the
field of economic relationships. It is not necessary to de-
termine whether the duty of one to another is of decisional
or statutory origin. Irrespective of the method of creation,
certain activity is privileged while other activity bears no
such privilege. Permissible or prohibited limits are man-
made and the extent of the activity will be commensurate
with the maturity of the makers. Contemporary labor re-
lations dictate recognition of the fact that the views of
labor and management are not necessarily diametrically
opposed. 6 ' The sooner both parties realize that they must
deal with each other in good faith and that the courts or
legislatures cannot be used as an avenue for obtaining
economic advantage or to avoid unionization, the sooner
tranquillity and stability will prevail.
In labor-management affairs dynamic human relations
are constantly at play; the problems cannot be looked at in
a vacuum, nor can a pure utopia be reached. Solutions
must be viewed in relative concepts and results can only
be measured by retrospective application. This then, in the
first instance, is the task of the Supreme Court and then
Congress. Undoubtedly, Congress will make the delinea-
tion between federal and state jurisdiction. Perhaps it will
also more clearly define the federal scope of economic
conflict. But square pegs do not fit round holes, and out-
lines and delineations unless shaped around the basis
160 See Mamet, The Role of The Labor Lawyer in Labor Relations. 46
IM. L. Rv. 575 (1951); 3 LAB. L. J. 200 (1952).
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of need and knowledge will soon crumble. Thus, any
federal answer which ignores the occurrences in the state
labor law complex cannot be comprehensive. Only if the
state law is analyzed can there be coordination instead of
confusion, because for smoothness of operation federal law
must be complemented by state law; it is a necessary
counterpart in the labor equation.
Bernard M. Mamet*
0 Labor Attorney wih principal offices in Chicago, Illinois.
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